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We investigate the effect of regulatory enforcement actions on banks’ reputation by estimating 
the effect of non-compliance with laws and regulations among lead arrangers on the structure 
of syndicated loans. Consistent with a regulatory reputational stigma, a punished lead arranger 
increases her loan share to entice participants to continue to co-finance the loan. Consequently, 
when punished lead arranger initiates a new syndicated loan, then this loan tends to be more 
concentrated and co-funded by participants with previous collaboration with the lead arranger. 
However, the observed share increases by punished lead arrangers are seemingly mitigated by 
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What effects do regulatory enforcement actions enacted on banks for breaches of laws and 
regulations have on the punished lead banks’ reputation? Our study is the first to address this 
question coupling comprehensive sanctions with syndicated loan market data, to test 
hypotheses derived from a representative theoretical framework. In the syndicated loan market, 
the lead (principal) arranger and the participants form a syndicate to provide large corporate 
loans that a single bank cannot (or is unwilling to) finance alone. Regulatory enforcement 
actions enacted on lead arrangers potentially impose a reputational burden between the 
punished banks and their relationship with the participant banks. Reputational considerations 
play a central role in the syndicated loan market because participant lenders repeatedly interact 
and have long organizational memories that influence their beliefs and asymmetric 
information. Evidence from this burden would come from a significant change in the loan 
syndicate structure, whereby the punished lead arranger is forced to retain a considerably larger 
share of the syndicated loan. This is the first paper that investigates the reputation burden 
stemming from the punishment of banks with enforcement actions. 
We first discuss the link between the syndicate structure and the punished lead bank’s 
reputational loss. Using a theoretical framework, we posit that a punished lead arranger faces 
a reputational loss reflected in her diminished ability to attract participants and in turn enhanced 
needs to incentivize participant banks to co-finance the project. To do so, the lead arranger 
must hold a larger share of the loan that will commit the arranger to a great deal of monitoring 
effort (and thus in the model to increase the project’s success potential). Apart from the 
screening and monitoring effort, the prospective risk to earnings or capital arising from a joint 
venture with a punished lead arranger might also lead to concentrated syndicates and loans 




We empirically examine the validity of these theoretical arguments using data from 
three different sources. Specifically, we use the enforcement actions enacted on lead lenders 
from a hand-collected dataset by Delis et al. (2017b), data on all U.S. syndicated loans (the unit 
of our analysis) available in DealScan, and matched identification codes on banks from the 
Call Reports. We stress that these enforcement actions are quite important penalties, enacted 
purely for safety and soundness reasons and thus are fairly homogeneous events. Our data set 
spans the period 1997 through 2014 to allow a window around enforcement actions enacted 
during the years 2001-2010. 
Our empirical model aims to establish causality running from the enforcement actions 
to the structure of the syndicated loan. Our main explanatory variable is a dummy that takes 
the value one for loans originated by punished banks after the enforcement action, zero for the 
loans originated by punished banks before the enforcement action, and also zero for loans 
originated by non-punished banks. More closely related to our theoretical model, we use as 
dependent variable the lead arranger’s share of the loan. In alternative specifications, we also 
use as dependent variables the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI) to analyze the concentration 
of holdings within the syndicate, the number of lenders participating in the syndicate, the total 
number of financial and general covenants, and the percentage of shares held by participant 
banks that have the same supervisor as the lead bank. 
Our main identification method accounts for potential unobserved variables, especially 
bank-year and firm-year ones that might bias our inference on the effect of the enforcement 
actions. Specifically, our data set comprises a cross-section of loans. Each lead arranger 
(including the punished ones) originates many loans, sometimes along with other lead 
arranger(s) within one year. This allows including bank*year fixed effects because the 
different lead arrangers in the same loan do not receive enforcement actions in the same year. 




the share of the punished lead bank with: (i) its own share in other similar loans (given loan 
controls) before the enforcement action, (ii) the share of the non-punished lead bank(s) of the 
same loan, and (iii) the share of all other lead banks in other loans. In this exercise, saturation 
fully accounts for alternative supply-side explanations of the findings, including changes in the 
business model of banks precisely related to the reasons of the enforcement action. Further, 
and equally important, in multiple occasions, firms borrow more than once within a year. This 
allows us to include firm*year fixed effects, which comprehensively account for alternative 
demand-side explanations of the findings. In addition, the bank*year and firm*year fixed 
effects fully control for common effects on all banks and firms, such as the impact of the 
subprime crisis. 
 Our baseline specification shows that an enforcement action enacted on a lead arranger 
increases that lender’s share by approximately 2.9 percentage points, which is a 15% increase 
for the average punished lead lender’s share in our sample. The HHI of the syndicate also 
increases by approximately 2.5 percentage points, the number of lenders decreases by 
approximately one lender, financial covenants increase by approximately 6.4%, and general 
covenants increase by approximately 12.5%. These results are aligned with the theoretical 
model’s predictions on the reputational impact of the enforcement action and the associated 
increased monitoring effort required from the lead arranger by the participants. The lead 
arranger increases the shares to provide a stronger signal for borrower's quality and to commit 
to higher screening and monitoring in order to incentivize the participants. 
Our results are robust to alternative model re-specifications, different subsamples, and 
an instrumental variable estimation. One important test is to further saturate the model with 
lead bank*firm*year fixed effects. Importantly, these fixed effects simultaneously control for 
the time-varying supply and demand effects on top of bank-firm relationships. A second 




members and the borrower are the same before and after the enforcement action. This implies 
that our results cannot be affected by changes in the members of the syndicate but only from 
the reputational shock. Finally, we consider an instrumental variables treatment effects model. 
As an IV, we identify the share of female examiners in local supervisory offices, cleaned from 
annual trends and local conditions (Delis et al., 2017b). We extensively discuss how these 
variables meet the exclusion restriction and show their significant explanatory power as 
determinants of enforcement actions. The results from the IV method are aligned with those 
from the fixed effects method. 
 We also show empirically that there are important loan and bank characteristics that 
moderate the positive effect of enforcement actions on the lead lender’s participation share. 
Evidently, the inclusion of loan characteristics like guarantor, performance pricing provisions, 
and covenants moderates the positive impact of enforcement actions through reducing 
informational asymmetries. Similarly, relationship lending between either the lead bank and 
participant banks or the lead bank and the borrower plays a similar role. Finally, the effect of 
enforcement actions is potent in the medium term (three to four years post-enforcement) but is 
completely offset for banks that improve their performance by that period. 
 Our paper makes contributions to three strands of literature. First, several studies 
provide incentives in which bank reputation serves as a bounding device that deters highly 
reputable banks from shirking their information production (Booth and Smith, 1986; 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994, among others). Demiroglu and James (2010) indicates that 
borrowing cost are lower for loans sponsored from private equity groups. The existing literature 
on loan syndicate structure uses a lead arranger’s market share as a proxy for its reputation and 
shows that when borrowing firms require more-intense monitoring, the lead arranger retains a 
larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate (Dennis and Mullineaux, 




measured by large-scale bankruptcies, on its subsequent syndication activity and Lin et al. 
(2012) show that when control-ownership divergence is large, then the lead arranger retains 
higher shares.  
Although this evidence is consistent with a reputation story, it is also consistent with 
alternative explanations based on matching between better quality borrowers and large lead 
arrangers, and the exercise of bank market power (Delis et al., 2017a). Unlike these papers, we 
do not assume the effectiveness of the reputation mechanism, but instead explore variation in 
it in the cross-section and over time. Our research studies the enforcement actions enacted on 
banks for safety and soundness reasons, as the “reputational devices” that affects the structure 
of the syndicate. This is crucial, because supervisory actions related to safety and soundness of 
banks, might have a strong reputational effect on which the literature is generally silent. 
Moreover, such important enforcement actions provide almost by definition clear-cut 
reputational “innovations” that allow us to test a rich set of predictions regarding the 
effectiveness, and limitations, of reputation-based disciplining mechanisms. 
 A second strand of literature analyzes the effect of enforcement actions on banks’ risk 
and performance. Delis et al. (2017b) document that enforcement actions only moderately 
reduce the aggregate risk-weighted assets and non-performing loans ratios of punished banks, 
with no accompanying increase in the level of regulatory capital. Ioannidou (2005) suggests 
that a central bank with a dual mandate (monetary policy and bank supervision) alters bank 
supervisory behavior in terms of imposing penalties vis-à-vis supervisors without a dual 
mandate. Nguyen et al. (2016) show that board monitoring is effective in reducing the 
probability that banks receive enforcement actions from regulators.1 A more dated literature 
(e.g., Brous and Leggett, 1996; Slovin et al., 1999) provides similar findings on the effect of 
                                                 
1 Delis and Staikouras (2011) use aggregate data on the number of enforcement actions across countries and 
document similar results. Danisewicz et al. (2014) suggest that enforcement actions have adverse short-term 




enforcement actions on bank risk. Despite the important implications of enforcement actions 
on banks’ business management and corporate culture, existing research on the consequences 
of these actions on the real economy is limited. Our paper provides a direct evidence on how 
regulatory market-discipline actions affect the real economy by looking at the contract design 
of the syndicated loan market.  
 Finally, we establish a tradeoff between reputation and lead arranger shares that has 
analogies in the broader corporate governance literature. For example, Calomiris and Carlson 
(2016) show that bank manager ownership is a substitute for formal corporate governance tools 
to ensure proper effort by the manager. In general, bank managers who have large stakes in 
their banks’ performance could exert greater effort in managing risk to preserve their own 
financial wealth (Demsetz et al., 1997; Laeven and Levine, 2009). Thus, the analysis conducted 
here for lead lender shares provides empirical ground for a broad theoretical basis that goes 
back to at least Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). 
 The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses our theoretical mechanism 
and, based on its implications, specifies our testable hypotheses. Section III describes the 
empirical model and our identification method. Section IV discusses the empirical results. 
Section V concludes.  
 
II. Theoretical Mechanism 
Information asymmetries between contracting parties fundamentally impact the design of 
optimal contract (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). For syndicated 
loan deals, which involve two or more parties lending to a single borrower, information 
asymmetries can exist between the borrower and lenders as well as among the lenders 
themselves (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). To create incentives for monitoring, a lead arranger 




observe the level of monitoring activities. The share retained is larger as the moral hazard 
problem increases (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Sufi, 2007; among others). 
In this section, we sketch our theoretical argument by adopting a narrative approach to 
the formation of the syndicate when the lead lenders’ reputation suffers a loss due to an 
enforcement action. A formal and extended theoretical model for this argument is provided in 
Appendix I. The syndicated loan market is an ideal setup to identify the necessary conditions 
for a reputation-based disciplining mechanism to work because the reputation of the lead 
arranger determines participants' beliefs. The main reason for this is the principal arranger 
responsibility for all price-setting decisions and the monitoring process of the loan (Sufi, 2007; 
Ivashina, 2009).  
 Assuming that a principal arranger wants to partially finance a project with positive net 
present value using the syndicated loan market, she writes a contract determining the share of 
the loan financed by her and the share of the loan financed by the potential participants. The 
project’s success positively depends on the project’s inherent success potential and on the lead 
arranger’s monitoring effort. The monitoring effort is extremely important in our case because 
a potential participant would like the lead arranger to exert as much monitoring effort as 
possible to maximize the possibility of the loan’s success.  
 In the syndicated loan market, there is no third party that can enforce the level of 
monitoring effort and hence the unobservability of lead’s monitoring effort creates potentially 
severe asymmetric information problems that must be considered in optimal syndicate design 
(Ivashina, 2009). This represents a possible source of moral hazard and the potential participant 
must form rational expectations about the monitoring effort of the lead arranger based on the 
available information. 
 Given that a lead arranger’s monitoring technology does not depend on the share of the 




in the share of the project that she finances. Indeed, a lender is more willing to undertake costs 
that increase the chances that she will “get her money back” when she has contributed a large 
amount of money rather than when she only participated to a small extent. 
 In this study, we closely link the lead arranger’s reputation with the regulator’s signal 
on the lead arranger’s compliance with regulatory law on the books. Specifically, if a principal 
arranger is found to have engaged in legal or regulatory misconduct, especially for important 
reasons related to financial safety and soundness, then she receives an enforcement action that 
is publicly announced. It is then natural to assume that such actions reveal that the lead arranger 
has certain undesired characteristics, most notably risky behavior, leading to increased moral 
hazard for participants. This increased moral hazard stems from the worsened reputation of the 
punished lead arranger. It follows that penalized lead arrangers are less appealing to potential 
participants compared to non-penalized lead banks. 
 Hence, punished lead arrangers need to compensate potential participants for these 
reputational costs. Theory predicts that an important way through which participant banks can 
be compensated is participation share. Leland and Pyle (1977) and many others henceforth, 
highlight that an increase in the ownership of the informed party would signal a higher quality 
of the underlying project thereby reducing the cost of asymmetric information. In our case, this 
will be more so because a higher participation share by the punished lead bank will signal 
higher monitoring effort. This leads to our testable hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Signed contracts designed by lead arrangers with high reputational risks, 
should be such that the lead arranger’s share is higher compared with the lead arranger’s 





Hypothesis 2: Signed contracts designed by lead arrangers with high reputational risk, will 
have a more concentrated structure compared to contracts design by lead arrangers with low 
reputational risk. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Participant banks should be less willing to engage in a contract that is designed 
by lead arrangers with high reputational risks. 
 
III. Empirical Model, Data, and Identification Problems 
 
A. Empirical Specification and Variables 
To empirically test our hypothesis, we use the following equation: 
𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 + 𝑎1𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓𝑏𝑙𝑡.     (1) 
In Equation (1), 𝑆 represents the syndicate loan structure. In most part, we use the loan share 
of a lead bank b. 𝐿 is a vector of loan characteristics used as control variables. In turn, 
𝑎𝑓 denotes a vector of fixed effects and u is the remainder disturbance. 
 The variable of main interest is PEL (post enforcement loan), which is a dummy taking 
the value one for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date 𝑡 of the enforcement 
and zero for loans originated before the date of the enforcement action. Post enforcement loan 
also takes the value zero for all loans originated by lead banks that were never punished during 
our sample period (see also Table I, which includes definitions for all variables used in our 
analysis). A positive value on 𝑎1 implies that once a lead arranger is punished, the lead 
arranger’s mean loan share is larger relative to the lead arranger’s mean loan share before the 
enforcement action or the mean leads’ share of never punished banks. 
[Insert Table I about here] 
 To estimate Equation (1), we combine information from three different sources. First, 




U.S.: The Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). All insured commercial and savings 
banks in the U.S. have one of the above agencies as their primary federal supervisor (Ioannidou, 
2005). In general, the supervisory organization conducts a full-scope on-site examination of 
each insured depository institution at least once every 12 months.2 This examination involves 
an audit procedure necessary to evaluate all components of the Uniform Financial Institutions 
Ratings Systems (UFIRS) or the CAMELS rating system assigned to each bank.3 The findings 
from the on-site examinations and CAMELS determine whether a formal enforcement action 
will be enacted.4 These are legally enforced and disclosed to the public. 
Importantly, only the important enforcement actions related to bank safety and 
soundness should bear reputational risk (e.g., Nguyen et al., 2015). Delis et al. (2017b) group 
the formal enforcement actions according to their rationale into a number of groups, mostly 
reflecting the action’s severity and relation with safety and soundness issues.5 We follow this 
study and only include actions related to the Basel Committee Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision (Basel, 2012). These include capital adequacy and liquidity, asset quality, 
provisions and reserves, large exposures and exposures related to parties, internal control and 
audit systems, money laundering, bank secrecy, and foreign assets control. We also include 
breaches of the requirements concerning the fitness and propriety of banks’ board members 
                                                 
2 Different on-site audit frequencies can apply to banks that have been examined by the state authorities, to well-
capitalized and well-managed small banks, to banks in operation for less than five years, and to bank holding 
companies depending on their size and complexity. In our sample, most of the banks are large and are under 
relatively uniform inspection by regulators, most of the time involving the regulators maintaining offices inside 
the banks’ headquarters. 
3 The components of CAMELS are capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management (M), earnings (E), 
liquidity (L), and sensitivity to market risk (S). 
4 There are also informal actions that are not disclosed to the public, so information on them is private and does 
not contain reputational risk. Such actions mostly are voluntary commitments made by a bank’s board members 
to correct problems and consist of commitment letters, memoranda of understanding, and approved safety and 
soundness plans. 
5 Delis et al. (2017b) define the enforcement action dummy equals to one at the event quarter during which a 
sanction is imposed on a bank and zero otherwise, while no other formal enforcement action of the same or 




and senior management, as well as other persons closely associated with banks (institution-
affiliated parties). However, we demonstrate that our results are robust when excluding the 
latter. We extensively discuss the types of enforcement actions and their rationale (both those 
we use and those we do not) in Appendix II. 
Second, we obtain data for U.S. syndicated loans from DealScan over the period 1997-
2014. Thus, even for enforcement actions enacted in 2010, we have four years of data after 
their enactment. We also match information from DealScan with banks that received 
enforcement actions using bank-level coding from the Call Reports. This matching process 
allows identifying the accounting characteristics of banks involved in the loan and using these 
characteristics as control variables. We do the same for firms, by matching our end sample with 
Compustat. 
 Following the literature (e.g., Sufi, 2007), we measure the syndicate loan structure with 
several alternative measures. First, we use the share of the loan held by the lead lender, which 
is the dependent variable most directly relevant to our theoretical considerations. A closely 
related variable is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of the syndicate, which shows the 
concentration of holdings within a loan syndicate. Finally, we also examine different 
subcategories of the total number of lenders participating in the syndicate to explore whether 
the average syndicate size decreases following an enforcement action on a lead arranger. 
 We control for various loan characteristics such as the maturity and amount of the loan 
facility (e.g., Ivashina, 2009). Downgrading is a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is 
downgraded and zero otherwise. In a similar fashion, we use performance pricing, collateral, 
and relationship lending (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010), which are also dummy variables, 
taking a value equal to one if the loan has performance pricing provisions, is secured with 
collateral, and the lead arranger has made a loan to the same borrower in the past five years 




purpose fixed effects to saturate our model from differences in syndicate structure due to loan 
type or purpose (for more extensive definitions, see Table I). 
 After removing from our data missing observations on the variables to be included in 
our analysis, we have 75,125 loan facilities originated by 763 lead banks.6 From these, 74 banks 
received 79 enforcement actions (events) during 2001-2010.7 The number of post-enforcement 
loans in our baseline specifications is 15,885. The vast majority of the banks received an 
enforcement action only once, while in very few cases banks received two actions more than 
three years apart. Thus, we anticipate that the reputation effect on the syndicate loan structure 
should be strong, as banks in our sample are receiving enforcement actions once (in most cases) 
or twice at most. Note that the number of enforcement actions is not quite relevant to the sample 
size of the empirical analysis because we assume (and we impose) that these are uniform 
events.8 What matters, and what constitutes the unit of our analysis, are the numbers of loans 
pre and post enforcement. 
Table II provides basic descriptive statistics for the sample of banks that received a 
penalty at some point during our sample period (Panel A), for the full sample of lead arrangers 
(Panel B) and for our dependent variables for the punished and non-punished lead arrangers 
(Panel C). The summary statistics of Panel C are particularly interesting. They reveal a 
statistically significant 9.7 percentage point difference between the non-punished and punished 
lead lender shares, alongside a 9.2 percentage points higher HHI and a lower number of lenders 
                                                 
6 The unit of our analysis is the loan facility and not the loan package. The difference between the two is that the 
loan facility refers to each individual portion of a deal, whereas the deal itself possibly (but not usually) comprises 
more than one loan facilities and covers the full amount of credit granted to the firm on that occasion. A loan-
facility analysis is appropriate for the following reason. Loan facilities may have different starting dates, maturity, 
amount, and loan type. Hence, multiple loan facilities, even when in the same loan deal, are not fully dependent 
observations (e.g., simply adding facilities and ignoring their differences, may therefore introduce a bias in the 
estimates). However, all results presented in this paper are robust to a loan-package analysis. 
7 The number of enforcement actions by year is: 2001 (8 enforcement actions), 2002 (6), 2003 (7), 2004 (7), 2005 
(6), 2006 (8), 2007 (5), 2008 (7), 2009 (14), 2010 (11). Thus, the number of enforcement actions is relatively 
evenly distributed across years, even though with some small increase in the crisis period. This is in contrast to 
Delis et al. (2017b), who use almost the entirety of supervised U.S. banks and denote a clear concentration of 
enforcement actions during and shortly after the crisis period. 




(by approximately 2.7 lenders). In our empirical analysis, we aim to examine whether these 
effects are causal. 
[Insert Table II about here] 
 
B. Identification Problems  
Our empirical model aims to test the hypothesis that an enforcement action enacted on a lead 
arranger hampers the lead arranger’s reputation and requires him to hold a larger share of the 
loan. This is also equivalent to the lead arranger deciding to keep a larger share of the loan to 
persuade participants to co-finance the loan. In our context, we cannot imagine reasons for 
reverse causality, because an enforcement action is not enacted in response to the structure of 
a specific loan’s syndicate. Identifying the causal effect of an enforcement action on syndicate 
structure can be impeded, however, by omitted variables that the syndicate structure of post-
enforcement loans could capture erroneously.  
 Such omitted-variable bias could lead to two alternative explanations of the findings. 
First, from a supply-side viewpoint, enforcement actions are not exogenous to the business 
model of banks. The types of enforcement actions especially considered in our paper are a 
treatment for important safety and soundness problems incurred by banks in the pre-treatment 
period. Post-treatment, the punished banks ought to move to a more prudent risk equilibrium, 
thus restructuring their lending and their loan shares. The changes in the business model of 
banks pre- and post-enforcement, including associated changes in corporate governance, need 
to be accounted for to be able to attribute the effect of enforcement actions on loan shares to 
reputation. Similarly, our results might be due to heightened supervisory scrutiny, which limits 





Second, from a demand-side viewpoint, an enforcement action could lead to lower 
demand for credit by firms from the punished bank and this might be especially true during the 
crisis. If demand drops, the lead arranger might decide to hold a larger share of the loan to 
either show confidence in the firm or simply because the drop in demand from other firms freed 
resources. Obviously, this has less to do with the lead bank’s reputation within the syndicate. 
Similarly, if the less risky firms decide to leave the punished banks after the enforcement 
action, the punished bank will be left with the riskier firms, for which it holds a higher loan 
share irrespective of the action. 
In the next section, we discuss solutions to these identification problems. We begin with 
a event-type study estimated with time-invariant fixed effects regressions and, subsequently, 
implement models with time-varying fixed effects and instrumental variables treatment effects. 
 
IV. Identification Methods and Empirical Results 
A. Baseline Results  
Table III reports our baseline results. In our event study, the timing of the enforcement actions 
varies across banks and so, we employ a D-in-D effect with the staggered enactment of 
sanctions. We utilize the bank fixed effects to capture differences between the treatment and 
benchmark groups and time fixed effects to aggregate fluctuations in the dependent variable. 
In addition, we employ firm fixed effects to saturate unobserved firm-specific characteristics 
affecting the structure of the loan syndicate, and loan-type and loan-purpose fixed effects to 
control for the respective loan types (Sufi, 2007).  
In all specifications, the effect of the enforcement action on various measures of 
syndicate structure in the first year after the enactment is statistically significant at 1% level 
(except column III which is at 5% level). The results in column I show that an enforcement 




A very similar picture appears when using as our dependent variables the HHI of the loan 
syndicate and the number of lenders. We find that an enforcement action increases the 
concentration of holdings within the syndicate by 1.8 percentage points and a decrease in the 
number of lenders by one.9 
[Insert Table III about here] 
Our first buffer against the alternative explanations of our findings is to use the multi-
level structure of our data set. The banks in our sample originate many loans per year both pre-
enforcement and post-enforcement (within the enforcement year). Including bank*year fixed 
effects controls for much of the reasons leading to the enforcement action (in the year before 
the action) and for changes in bank behavior in the year after the year of the enforcement action.  
The bank*year fixed effects are not perfectly collinear with PEL for two reasons. First, 
there is within-year variation in the year of the enforcement because PEL changes within that 
year if a punished bank gives loans both pre- and post-enforcement. Second, for the same loan 
for which a lead arranger receives an enforcement action (so that post enforcement loan equals 
one), the other lead arranger(s) have not received an action. However, these non-punished lead 
arrangers originate other loans with other non-punished banks, and for these loans post 
enforcement loan equals zero in the year of the action.10 
This creates a DDD exercise. The first differencing involves the share of the loan a lead 
bank holds before and after the enforcement action within the enforcement year; the second 
involves the share of the same loan of the punished lead bank vs. that of the non-punished lead 
bank(s); and the third involves the share of the punished lead bank vs. the share of all other 
lead banks in other loans. This procedure creates an almost ideal natural experiment to 
                                                 
9 In Appendix III we report results using a sub-sample only for punished banks that received a sanction during our 
sample period. In all specifications of Table A.II, the effect of the enforcement action on various measures of 
syndicate structure in the first year after the enactment is quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the baseline 
results. 




completely saturate the reputation effect from other supply (punished lead bank)-side 
explanations of the findings, including the reasons that led to the penalty and changes in the 
business model of banks post-enforcement.  
We should also note that this method reduces concerns on our results being due to 
increased regulatory scrutiny (and not due to reputational effects). Supervisory scrutiny is 
increased not at the time of the enforcement action but well before the enforcement date when 
the supervisor notes the underlying safety and soundness problems (related to the important 
enforcement actions we use in this paper). This implies that supervisory scrutiny is not strictly 
changing with enforcement, but most probably is considerably higher in both pre- and post-
enforcement periods from which we obtain identification when using the bank*year fixed 
effects. Further, syndicated loans are mostly given by large banks. Regulators usually hold 
offices within these banks, so that supervisory scrutiny is already quite high for these banks. 
Equally important, many firms in our sample borrow more than once within each year. 
This allows the inclusion of firm*year fixed effects. These fixed effects saturate the model 
from unobserved firm (demand) characteristics that could also render the effect of post 
enforcement loan endogenous. Further, the differences in the timing of the enactment across 
banks implies that the existence of a systematic omitted variable affecting both post 
enforcement loan and the structure of the syndicate is unlikely. Also, there are several 
enforcement actions before the crisis, so that the results are not solely driven by developments 
in this period (even though the bank*year and firm*year fixed effects must saturate the findings 
from crisis effects).  
Table IV reports our results from the fixed effects models. In the first three 
specifications, the effect of the enforcement action on various measures of syndicate structure 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. The results in column I show that an enforcement 




theoretical predictions) in the syndicate by approximately 2.9 percentage points. For the 
punished lead lender with an average share (equal to 19.3% in our sample), this finding implies 
a large increase of approximately 15%. Comparing these results to the univariate analysis in 
Panel C of Table II, we note that 2.9 percentage points out of the 9.7 percentage points 
difference in Lead lender shares between the pre- and post-enforcement periods are attributed 
to the reputational effects of the enforcement action. 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
A very similar picture appears when using as our dependent variables the HHI of the 
loan syndicate and the number of lenders (columns II and III of Table IV, respectively). We 
find that an enforcement action increases the concentration of holdings within the syndicate by 
2.6 percentage points or 15% for a punished lead bank with an average HHI in our sample. 
Concerning the total number of lenders, we find a reduction of approximately 1.1 lenders 
following an enforcement action. This reduction is still statistically significant but 
economically smaller compared with the previous variables. Thus, although there is a decrease 
in the number of lenders that participate in a loan syndicate when the lead arranger receives an 
enforcement action, the most significant effect comes from the lead arranger taking up a larger 
share of the loan. Once more, these effects are economically larger compared to the respective 
effects identified in Table III, showing the importance of including the relevant fixed effects to 
limit the omitted variable bias.  
The participants’ decision to collaborate in the syndicated loan market is taken through 
a mix of borrower’s quality and the reputation of the lead arranger. To the extent that 
participants are uncertain about a lead arranger’s reputation, enforcement actions are likely to 
lower participants’ assessment of the lead arranger’s ability and thus damaging her reputation. 
On the other hand, the presence of financial and general covenants is motivated by these 




borrower’s financial activity and therefore decrease the uncertainty to the lender (Murfin 
2012).11 In our context, enforcement actions are associated with a reputational burden that 
disincentivizes participants to do business. Thus, a tightening contract is positively related with 
the participation decision through a higher number of covenants. Columns IV and V of Table 
IV show that post-enforcement loans generated by punished lead arrangers have more financial 
and general covenants by 0.064 and 0.125 points, respectively. 
The identifying assumption in our empirical analysis thus far is that after controlling 
for time-varying borrower (demand-side) effects, time-varying lender (supply-side) effects, 
and loan characteristics, enforcement actions are exogenous. This allows us to interpret our 
findings as arising from a loss of the lead arranger’s reputation following enforcement actions 
enacted from the regulator. However, an alternative driving mechanism emerges from the 
potential unwillingness of participant lenders to do business with a bank that is “on the target 
list” of the regulator.12 To assess this alternate explanation of our findings, we perform the 
following test. In column VI of Table IV, we use the percentage of shares held by participant 
banks that have the same supervisor with the lead bank as the dependent variable. If our results 
are due to the alternative explanation, we should expect a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on post enforcement loan. However, the statistically insignificant coefficient on 
post enforcement loan we find indicates otherwise and does not support this alternative 
explanation. 
                                                 
11 General covenants restrict a borrower’s actions, such as the amount of acquisitions or debt issuance while 
financial covenants require borrowers to maintain a minimum level of a financial ratio or value, such as a 
maximum debt ratio. If a borrowing firm fails to satisfy a covenant, a technical default results. Lenders will often 
waive these covenant violations in return for renegotiating the loan’s terms. 
12 Enforcement actions are costly not only because the affected entities have to spend money and resources 
correcting the problems identified by the regulator, but also because they become the regulator’s target until 
problems are fixed. In the words of Thomas J. Curry (Comptroller of the Currency, November 2014), “The 
enforcement actions we are issuing today make clear that the OCC will take forceful action, not only when the 
institutions we supervise engage in wrongdoing, but when management fails to exercise the oversight necessary 





Our results are aligned with the hypotheses one and two. Specifically, once a lead 
arranger is punished, the structure of the syndicated loan changes so that the lead arranger holds 
significantly larger shares and forms more concentrated syndicates, ceteris paribus. Given our 
identification method, the economic mechanism is that sanctions hurt the lead arranger’s 
reputation and the participant banks exert a market-discipline mechanism demanding from the 
lead arranger to have more “skin” in the syndicate to commit in higher monitoring. In Sections 
F below, we empirically dig deeper into this conjecture regarding the lead arranger’s 
monitoring effort. 
 
B. Additional Identification Tests Using the Fixed Effects Model 
In even more restrictive specifications, we resort to the inclusion of firm*year*lead bank fixed 
effects. These fixed effects simultaneously control for the time-varying demand and time-
varying supply unobserved factors as discussed above, but also for unobserved factors specific 
to the lead bank-firm relationship that might affect our main results.13 The results, reported in 
Table V, are very similar with those of Table IV. The effect of post enforcement loan on the 
lead lender shares (column I) and HHI (column II) are, if anything, economically a bit stronger; 
the results on the number of lenders (column III) a bit weaker; financial covenants (column 
IV) weaker; general covenants (column V) slightly stronger; and participant share (%) 
(column VI) statistically insignificant results. 
[Insert Table V about here] 
In Table VI we conduct several additional robustness tests. We report the results only 
for the lead lender’s share. First, in column I we restrict our sample only to the observations 
where all the syndicate members, both banks and firms, are repeated before and after the 
                                                 
13 An alternative would be to include firm*year*syndicate fixed effects to keep the syndicate constant, but in that 




enforcement action. This is a powerful test for the effect of the enforcement action on lead 
lender shares because the results on post enforcement loan cannot be attributed, inter alia, to a 
change in the synthesis of the syndicate. The results are still statistically and economically 
significant. Specifically, the effect of an enforcement action on the lead lender’s share is 1.2 
percentage points or approximately 6.4% for the average loan share of a punished lead arranger. 
We attribute the somewhat smaller economic effect of the results mainly to the much smaller 
sample. 
[Insert Table VI about here] 
In column II we examine the effect of an enforcement action only to participant banks, 
in order to disentangle changes in the structure of the loan syndicates transmitted from 
participants to lead arrangers. This essentially is a placebo test: identifying an effect arising 
from the side of the participants would imply that our baseline results capture something else 
besides the reputation effect on the lead arranger. Evidently, the effect of post enforcement 
loan is economically small and statistically insignificant, implying that enforcement actions on 
participant lenders do not play a role in the structure of the loan syndicate.  
In column III we examine the sensitivity of our findings when we exclude loans for 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and for mergers and acquisitions (M&As). These loans present, in 
principle, more complete information because the syndicate has acquired private information 
about the borrowing firm from prior transactions (Ivashina and Kovner, 2011). Thus, we expect 
that the participant banks would be even more reluctant to fully engage in loans that exclude 
LBOs and M&As (i.e., the participants would require higher participation shares from the lead 
lender compared with our baseline findings). Indeed, the coefficient estimates on post 
enforcement loan are economically more significant when we exclude loans for LBOs and 
M&As, reflecting the importance of incomplete information in forming the effect of 




Further, in column IV we use only the enforcement actions directly related to the 
guidelines of the Basel Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Basel, 
2012), which bear a higher reputational risk on the punished bank (Delis et al., 2017b; Vallascas 
and Hagendorff, 2013). In this respect, we do not mark as post-enforcement loans those when 
enforcement actions are issued on lead-bank affiliated members (e.g., bank directors and 
managers). Given that the latter actions are less closely related to safety and soundness, the 
remainder ones should have a more potent impact on the reputation of the lead arranger and, 
thus, a higher effect on lead lender’s share. As the results show, this is indeed the case. 
The 2007-2009 crisis significantly affected the syndicated loan market in many 
respects, including interest rates and loan syndicate structures. An argument against our 
reputation-based story of our findings is that large banks are more likely to work with 
institutional investors as lead arrangers and their share would have mechanically gone up in 
the crisis when the institutional investors pulled back from the syndicated loan market. In this 
respect, we conduct two additional tests. First, we consider models including bank-year 
characteristics and only bank (not bank*year) fixed effects. We report the results from two 
such models (columns I and II of Table VII), the first including bank size and the second 
without bank size. The results of the two specifications are almost identical and equivalent to 
our baseline in Table IV. We interpret these results as evidence against the bank-size 
explanation of our findings. Second, in the columns III and IV of Table VII, we split the sample 
between enforcement actions enacted in the periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2010.14 We find that 
the coefficient on post enforcement loan is statistically and economically significant in both 
sub-periods.      
[Insert Table VII about here] 
                                                 
14 We prefer splitting the sample to introducing an interaction term with a relevant dummy. The reason is that the 
crisis has potentially affected all the explanatory variables and, by splitting the sample, we allow changes in the 





C. Results from Instrumental Variables Estimation 
A potential problem with the inclusion of several fixed effects is that we drop significant 
information from our results, given that not all banks (firms) in our sample lend (borrow) pre-
enforcement and post-enforcement. In this section, we consider an instrumental variables 
model that includes only loan type and loan purpose fixed effects. We select our instrument 
using the implications of a recent literature on the determinants of enforcement actions. 
Delis et al. (2017b) instrument enforcement actions with the share of female examiners 
in local supervisory offices (see Table I). The theory backing this instrument comes from 
corporate governance and psychology literatures, suggesting that females conduct more intense 
monitoring (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2009), are more risk-averse accounting auditors (e.g., 
Hardies et al. 2010, Ittonen et al., 2013) and possess greater moral reasoning skills (e.g., Eynon 
et al. 1997, Ittonen and Vähämaa 2012). We refine this variable by using the residuals from the 
regression of the share of female examiners in local offices on an annual trend (to capture the 
annual increase in the share of female examiners) and state fixed effects (to capture other local 
conditions). The exclusion restriction is satisfied in our context because the lead lenders’ shares 
are not directly formulated by bank examiners; they are indirectly formulated via the 
examination process and the enactment or not of enforcement actions. 
We conduct the IV analysis using a treatment effects model, which is suitable when the 
endogenous variable is binary. In Table VIII, columns I-VI, we replicate the results of Table 
IV, using the treatment effects model. In all specifications, we control in the first-stage 
regressions for the bank-year variables that describe the financial reasons behind the 
enforcement actions, namely risk-based capital ratio, non-performing loans, non-interest 
income, bank ROA, liquidity, and bank size. The first-stage results are in line with Delis et al. 




higher capital, ROA, and liquidity are considerably less likely to receive actions. In contrast, 
banks with higher non-performing loans are more likely to receive actions, whereas non-
interest income and size do not seem to play a significant role. The instrumental variable 
strongly and positively explains the probability of receiving enforcement actions. 
Apart from the small increase in standard errors, the second-stage results are in line 
with those of Table IV. The somewhat larger coefficient estimate on post enforcement loan in 
column I, suggests that an enforcement action increases lead lender shares by approximately 
3.4 percentage points. So, we conclude that inference from the treatment effects model is 
similar to the fixed effects model. To infer the validity of our instrumental variable, we also 
regress the second-stage residuals on all exogenous variables and the instrument (e.g., Cao et 
al., 2017). The results show that the adjusted R-Squared values are very close to zero and the 
chi-squared test easily rejects the null that the variables used in the probit first-stage are jointly 
significant in explaining the second-stage residuals. We report these results in the lower part 
of Table VIII.15 
[Insert Table VIII about here] 
A somewhat related identification problem is that lead lender shares might be 
simultaneously determined with loan amount, maturity, and loan guarantees, so that the latter 
are “bad controls.” The syndicated loans literature is mostly silent about this problem, but some 
papers do discuss possible solutions (e.g., Dennis et al., 2000; Delis et al., 2017b). The general 
solution is then to examine specifications without these loan controls (Angrist and Pischke, 
2008). We report the relevant results from the fixed effects and treatment effects models in 
Appendix V and Table A.III. The results show only small differences in coefficient on post 
enforcement loan relative to our baseline results.16 In addition, in the Appendix VI we test for 
                                                 
15 We obtain similar result when we regress the second stage residuals on the instrumental variable. 
16 There is also an argument against the type of simultaneity implying a bad controls problem. On average, the 
procedure for the origination of syndicated loans is as follows. First, the firm goes to a lead bank, asking for a 




pre-enforcement trends in the syndicated structure. Our results provide evidence that there is 
no pre-trend in the syndicate structure. 
 
D. Additional Specifications against a Regulatory Scrutiny Explanation of our Findings 
We have argued so far that our results cannot be overly attributed to regulatory scrutiny because 
increased regulatory scrutiny takes place well before the enforcement action, so that its effect 
is absorbed by the bank*year fixed effects (which essentially allow identification from loans 
originated within a maximum window of six months around the action). Indeed, Delis et al. 
(2017b) show that bank fundamentals react at least one quarter before the action, revealing the 
work of regulators prior to the enactment date. 
In this section, we conduct placebo tests to show that the effect of regulatory scrutiny 
is limited in the syndicated loans market, especially when using the fixed effects and treatment 
effects models. The core idea of these tests is that if regulatory scrutiny affects the syndicated 
lending activity of banks, we should observe significant differences in the number and volume 
of syndicated loans around enforcement actions, especially after controlling for bank*year 
fixed effects or bank variables identifying the reasons behind the action (i.e., bank capital, asset 
quality, earnings, liquidity, etc.). The same should hold for the probability of extending 
syndicated loans to new borrowers. 
In Appendix VII, we report results from specifications using the number of loans, the 
loan amount, and the probability of originating loans to new borrowers. We report two sets of 
results for fixed effects and treatment effects models. All specifications yield statistically 
insignificant coefficients on post enforcement loan. Interestingly, this is not the case when we 
                                                 
the loan amount and maturity (if needed), and sets an indicative interest rate. Once these have been set with some 
level of accuracy, the bank seeks for other interested banks to co-finance the loan. Of course, the participant banks 
can make requests, especially on the interest rate and loan guarantees, but these will be marginal compared to the 
proposition of the lead bank(s). In contrast, participant banks can (and do) ask for different shares of the loan, 




use a model without bank*year fixed effects. We interpret these findings as evidence that our 
setup buffers the effect of regulatory scrutiny on the syndicated lending decisions of banks.17 
 
E. Syndicate Structure and Participant Choice 
Overall, the results in the previous subsections indicate that, ceteris paribus, enforced lead 
arrangers retain a larger fraction of the loan post-enforcement. This evidence is consistent with 
our reputation hypothesis. In this subsection, we explore how post enforcement loan affects 
which lenders end up as syndicate members to provide evidence on hypothesis three. In Table 
IX we further inquire into the way the loan syndication is made up, using alternative elements 
of syndicated loan structure as dependent variables. Column I shows that the number of 
participant lenders decreases approximately by one lender. Column II shows that there is a 
statistically significant reduction in the number of lead lenders but that the economic 
significance is small. Similarly, participants are less likely to be foreign lenders when the lead 
arranger receives an enforcement action (column III). Finally, the results in column IV show 
that, post-enforcement, the amount held by the punished lead lender is approximately 3% 
higher at the mean (0.074/2.97). Combining these findings with the results of column III in 
Tables III, IV and V, we conclude that the reduction in the number of lenders comes mainly 
from the reduction in the number of participants. 
[Insert Table IX about here] 
Furthermore, we analyze how an enforcement action affects the participation decision. 
We employ a logit model with fixed effects. We define the “potential” participant set as (i) all 
financial institutions that were acting at least once as participants in the syndicated loan market 
over the whole sample period or (ii) financial institutions that were acting at least once as 
                                                 
17 Of course, this is not the situation for the general bank balance sheet of punished banks, as we observe an 8% 




participants in the syndicated loan market in the last five years. The lead arranger on the loan 
is not included in the participant choice set. The logit model explains how post enforcement 
loan (abbreviated as PEL in the equation) influences the probability of a financial institution 
being chosen as a participant:  





    (2) 
We are interested in the effect of PEL on the probability that a lender j is chosen as a 
participant in a loan l at time t. We control for unobserved heterogeneity using loan purpose, 
loan type, year and bank fixed effects. Table X reports marginal effects. In columns I and III, 
we use all banks that were acting at least once as participants in the syndicated loan market 
over the sample period. In columns II and IV, we limit the sample to banks that were acting at 
least once as participants in the syndicated loan market in the last 5 years. The estimation 
includes the loan control variables included in the previous tables. The results show that when 
the lead arranger receives an enforcement action, the probability of a lender being chosen as 
participant decreases. These findings provide evidence backing our testable hypothesis 3. 
[Insert Table X about here] 
 
F. Reducing Informational Asymmetries as a Buffer for the Identified Effects 
Banks clearly want to avoid enforcement actions, but after they occur, a lead bank in a loan 
syndicate must deal with its reputation and the syndicate structure. The emerging question is 
whether there exists a strategy that a punished lead arranger can follow to moderate the effect 
of the enforcement action on loan syndicate structure. An important issue in this respect is the 
alleviation of informational asymmetry problems among the participants, the lead arranger, and 
the borrower, so that the participant banks will perceive the loan as less risky. Given the 
model’s assumptions, the lead arranger’s monitoring effort and participation share should be 




informational asymmetry and increased monitoring effort (or rather, increased monitoring 
efficiency in the empirical sense of these characteristics) might have a moderating effect in the 
positive nexus between enforcement actions and the lead lender’s share. 
 In column I of Table XI, we introduce an interaction term between post enforcement 
loan and guarantee. Loan guarantees, thoroughly defined in Table I, are a more enhanced form 
of collateral aiming at lowering a loan’s riskiness in case of adverse developments for the 
borrower. The interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% level, and the marginal 
effect of post enforcement loan is negative and statistically significant. Clearly, the lead 
arranger can offset the effect of enforcement actions on his loan share by requesting a guarantee 
facility, indirectly passing the cost of the enforcement action to the borrower. 
[Insert Table XI about here] 
 Similarly, we use information on (i) whether the loan has performance pricing 
provisions and (ii) the number of general loan covenants. These are the main characteristics in 
loan contracts that directly relate to loan monitoring. We thus expect that use of such loan 
characteristics will also lower the potency of the effect of enforcement actions. We report the 
respective results in columns II and III of Table XI. In both specifications, the interaction terms 
between post enforcement loan and the variables related to loan monitoring are negative and 
statistically significant. Thus, our results confirm the discipline mechanism our model, showing 
that participant banks do require enhanced monitoring activity in the form of performance 
pricing provisions and general covenants. 
Another interesting angle that can moderate the effect of the enforcement action on loan 
syndicate structure is relationship intensity. Banks and borrowers repeatedly interact in the 
syndicated loan market and have long organizational memories that can mitigate reputational 
considerations. For every loan in our sample, we measure the relationship intensity by looking 




measures of relationship lending that capture the private information in the last five years 
before a current loan was issued between (i) lead-participant, (ii) lead-borrower and (iii) 
participant-borrower. The first measure is a dummy variable equal to one if the lead arranger 
has collaborated in previous syndicated loans with a given participant bank. The second 
dummy is equal to one if the lead arranger lent to the same borrower; and the last is equal to 
one if the participant bank lent to the same borrower.18 The key idea is to exploit a comparison 
with loans that they have relationships in the above categories, as prior experience reflects how 
members of the syndicate use “soft” information, which is hard to verify. We expect that the 
interaction term of these variables with post enforcement loan will be negatively associated 
with lead lender shares. 
Indeed, as reported in Table XII, we find strong evidence that relationship lending 
mitigates the reputational burden. In column I, we interact post enforcement loan with 
relationship lending between the lead arranger and the participant. The underlying assumption 
is that participants with prior experience with the lead arranger have a longer and deeper 
relationship, and thus the effect of enforcement actions on syndicate structure should be lower. 
The interaction term is negative and statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that a previous 
relationship between the lead arranger and the participant mitigates the reputational burden by 
increasing the lead lender shares by 1.38% (marginal effect), as opposed to 2.24% for loans 
without such relationship lending. We identify similar reductions in the effect of enforcement 
actions when we examine relationship lending between lead lender and borrower (column II) 
and participant lender and borrower (column III). These findings are consistent with theoretical 
considerations on the relevant reduction in informational asymmetries via repeated interaction, 
acquisition of soft information, etc. (e.g., Bharath et al., 2011). In Appendix VIII and Table 
                                                 




A.VI, we dig deeper into the bank’s sectoral exposure in mitigating the effect of enforcement 
actions. 
[Insert Table XII about here] 
 
 
E. Persistence of the Enforcement Actions 
In Table XIII we examine the persistence of the effect of enforcement actions in the medium-
term. In columns I and II, we use the full sample and modify post enforcement loan by 
restricting its impact to the first three years (column I) and the first four years (column II) after 
the penalty. The results show that the effect is positive, statistically significant, and close to the 
one identified in the baseline specification. This shows that the effect of the enforcement action 
on the lead lender’s share is still potent in the medium term. 
[Insert Table XIII about here] 
Can banks do something to mitigate this lasting effect? Given that many of the punished 
banks have low or negative profits, returning to profitability will signal improved financial 
health, which would in turn mitigate the reputational effect of enforcement actions in the 
medium term. Then, in columns III-IV we introduce an interaction term between post 
enforcement loan and a dummy variable equal to one for loans originated by punished banks 
that have a return on assets ratio higher than the mean of the punished banks three years post-
enforcement. The dummy also takes the value one for loans originated by non-punished lead 
banks; it takes the value zero for loans originated by punished banks that have a return on assets 
lower than the mean value of punished banks three years post-enforcement. The interaction 
term in columns III and IV is statistically significant at 1%, showing that the effect of an 




by banks with higher profitability. Thus, any lasting reputational effect (three to four years 
post-enforcement) is related to continuing poor performance of punished banks. 
 
V. Conclusions and Extensions 
With an aim to identify the reputational effect of regulatory enforcement of law on the books, 
we empirically study the role of important regulatory enforcement actions, enacted on banks 
for breaches of laws and regulations, on loan syndicate formation. The theoretical framework 
we develop suggests that an increase in reputational risk induces an increase in the lead 
arranger’s equilibrium participation share in the syndicate. 
 We therefore match hand-collected data on enforcement actions with data for 
syndicated loans, as well as data for characteristics of the lead arrangers and the borrowing 
firms, and we conduct an empirical analysis to test this theoretical hypothesis. We show that 
loans originated by a principal arranger after an enforcement action have a significantly higher 
participation share by the lead arranger. According to our baseline specification, an 
enforcement action increases the lead lender’s share by approximately 2.9 percentage points, a 
15% increase for a punished lead lender with an average share. The empirical results are very 
similar when we consider a battery of robustness tests, including an IV approach.  
 We further empirically show that this strong effect of an enforcement action can be 
mitigated, by including guarantees, performance pricing provisions, and covenants in the loan 
contract, or when there is prior relationship lending between either the lead bank of the 
syndicate and participant banks or between the lead bank and the borrower. These features 
apparently ease participant lenders’ concerns resulting from the lower informational 
asymmetry and higher monitoring efficiency of these loan contracts, elements that significantly 




actions on syndicate structure can be lasting if the performance of punished banks does not 
recover. 
 Our study opens new avenues for research in the field of regulatory enforcement actions 
and/or syndicated lending. Two such avenues are particularly interesting. First, we do not 
explore in this paper the effect of enforcement actions on syndicated loan pricing. On the one 
hand, enforcement actions might trigger more-competitive pricing to prevent losing business 
in light of reputational effects. On the other hand, the banks might pass along the cost of 
enforcement actions to borrowers, especially if banks have some market power in niche 
markets and specific industries or strong relationships with specific firms.  
 Second, the reasons behind enactment of enforcement actions are potentially 
interesting. Examining the price and non-price terms of syndicated loans for punished lead 
banks vis-à-vis the price and non-price terms of syndicated loans enacted on lead arrangers 
with similar CAMELS ratings that did not receive an enforcement action, might highlight 
important effects stemming from differences between regulators, networks of banks, political 
connections, and so on. Such a study would be constrained by the fact that regulatory decisions 
for enforcement actions are to some extent discretionary, which is endogenous and difficult to 
measure. Because we have covered a lot of ground already in this paper, we leave these ideas 
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Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable  Description Source 
 
Dependent variables: 
Lead lender shares (%)  The share of the loan held by the lead lender. DealScan 
HHI (%) A Herfindahl–Hirschman index used as a measure of concentration 
of holdings within the loan syndicate. Higher values reflect higher 
concentration. 
DealScan 
Number of lenders The total number of lenders participating in the loan syndicate. DealScan 
Financial covenants The number of financial covenants in the loan contract. Dealscan 
General covenants The number of non-financial covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Participant shares (%) Percentage of non-lead share held by participant banks that have the 
same supervisor. 
Dealscan 
Number of participants The total number of lenders participating in each loan. Dealscan 
Number of lead lenders The total number of lead lenders participating in each loan. Dealscan 
Number of foreign participants The total number of foreign lenders participating in each loan. Dealscan 
Deal amount held by lead ($M) The natural logarithm of the loan amount in $M held by the lead 
lender. 
Dealscan 
Main explanatory variable: 
Post enforcement loan A dummy variable equal to one for all loans originated by a punished 
bank in the years after the year of the enforcement action and zero 
otherwise (i.e., for the loans originated from all other banks or the 
punished bank before the enforcement action and the year of the 
enforcement action). As the sample of enforcement actions spans the 
years 2001-2010, we extend the sample to 1997-2014 to allow time 
before and after all enforcement actions. The enforcement actions 
include all actions (penalties) enacted on lead arrangers for breaches 
of laws and regulations in a number of cases. These cases include 
laws and regulations related to the Basel Committee Core Principles 
for Effective Banking Supervision (i.e., capital adequacy and 
liquidity, asset quality, provisions and reserves, large exposures and 
exposures related to parties, internal control and audit systems, 
money laundering, bank secrecy, consumer protection, and foreign 
assets control). They also include breaches of the requirements 
concerning the fitness and propriety of banks’ board members and 
senior management, as well as other persons closely associated with 
banks (institution affiliated parties). 
Websites of FED, 
FDIC, and OCC 
Post enforcement loan3 A dummy variable equal to one for the loans originated by a punished 
bank in the first three years after the year of the enforcement action 
and zero otherwise. Similar as in Post enforcement loan. 
Websites of FED, 
FDIC, and OCC 
Post enforcement loan4 A dummy variable equal to one for the loans originated by a punished 
bank in the first four years after the year of the enforcement action 
and zero otherwise. Similar as in Post enforcement loan. 
Websites of FED, 
FDIC, and OCC 
Loan controls: 
 
Maturity The natural logarithm of loan maturity in months. DealScan 
Facility amount The natural logarithm of the loan (facility) amount. DealScan 
Downgrading Dummy variable equal to one if the loan is downgraded and zero 
otherwise. 
DealScan 
Performance pricing Dummy variable equal to one if the loan has performance pricing 
provisions and zero otherwise. 
DealScan 
Collateral Dummy variable equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral 
and zero otherwise. 
DealScan 
Guarantee A facility backing the assumption of accountability for payment of a 
debt or performance of a person or entity obligation if the liable party 
fails to comply with expectations. 
DealScan 





Loan type Set of dummy variables describing loan type. The most common 
types are lines of credit (such as Revolver/Line, 364-Day Facility, 
Limited Line) or term loans (term loan A, B, C, D, E ) or a letter of 
credit or bridge loans. 
Dealscan 
Bank controls:   
Lead-participant relationship Dummy variable equal to one if the lead arranger has collaborated in 
the past five years with a given participant and zero otherwise. 
Dealscan and own 
calculation 
Lead-borrower relationship Dummy variable equal to one if the lead arranger lent to the same 
borrower in the past five years and zero otherwise. 
Dealscan and own 
calculation 
Participant-borrower relationship Dummy variable equal to one if the participant bank lent to the same 
borrower in the past five years and zero otherwise. 
Dealscan and own 
calculation 
Bank similarity (SIC2) Bank similarity between banks i and j in two digit borrower SIC code 
is a positive number, with zero corresponding to lack of similarity 
and larger values reflecting stronger similarity. 
Dealscan and own 
calculation 
Risk-based capital ratio The ratio of Tier1 and Tier 2 capital to risk-weighted assets. Call Reports 
Non-performing loans The ratio of non-performing loans (90 days) to total loans. Call Reports 
Non-interest income The ratio of non-interest income to total income. Call Reports 
Bank ROA The ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. Call Reports 
Liquidity  The ratio of liquid assets (cash plus short-term securities) to total 
assets. 
Call Reports 
Bank size The natural logarithm of total assets. Call Reports 
Firm controls:    
Firm Z-score Altman’s Z-score. Compustat and Orbis 
Firm ROA The ratio of pre-tax profits to total assets. Compustat and Orbis 
Firm leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets. Compustat and Orbis 
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets. Compustat and Orbis 
Instrumental variable:    
Female examiners The basis of this variable is the annual share of female examiners to 
total bank examiners in supervisors’ local offices. The variable used 
in the treatment effects model comprises the residuals of the 
regression of the share of female examiners on an annual trend (to 
capture the annual increase in the share of female examiners) and 
state fixed effects (to capture other local conditions). 






The table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are defined in 
Table I. Panel A reports the characteristics only for the punished lead arrangers. Panel B provides descriptive statistics 
for the total sample of active lead arrangers while panel C describes the difference between the punished and non-
punished lead arrangers and their t-test. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistic only for Banks with EA 
          Percentile distribution 
Variables Level Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th 
Lead lender shares (%) Loan 5,406 19.319 19.856 8.333 12.500 21.277 
HHI (%) Loan 5,406 17.620 19.042 7.143 11.111 20.000 
Number of lenders Loan 5,406 11.671 10.629 5.000 9.000 15.000 
Maturity Loan 5,404 3.766 0.636 3.584 4.094 4.094 
Facility amount Loan 5,406 5.410 1.375 4.605 5.521 6.310 
Downgrading Loan 5,406 0.282 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Performance pricing Loan 5,406 0.573 0.495 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Collateral Loan 5,406 0.491 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Lead-borrower relationship Loan 5,406 0.509 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Guarantee Loan 5,406 0.114 0.318 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistic for Total Lead Arrangers 
Lead lender shares (%) Loan 75,125 36.450 31.505 12.500 25.000 50.000 
HHI (%) Loan 75,125 32.951 29.808 11.111 20.000 50.000 
Number of lenders Loan 75,125 7.514 8.515 2.000 5.000 9.000 
Financial covenants Loan 75,125 0.983 1.478 0.000 0.000 2.000 
General covenants Loan 75,125 0.878 1.270 0.000 0.000 2.000 
Participant shares (%) Loan 75,125 29.030 23.595 14.286 20.513 33.333 
Number of participants Loan 75,125 4.524 3.672 2.000 3.000 6.000 
Number of lead lenders Loan 75,125 2.173 1.994 1.000 2.000 2.000 
Number of foreign participants Loan 75,125 2.327 4.544 0.000 1.000 3.000 
Deal amount held by lead ($M) Loan 75,125 3.010 1.696 2.120 3.056 3.945 
Post enforcement loan  Bank 75,125 0.070 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lead-participant relationship Bank 75,125 0.253 0.387 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Lead-borrower relationship Bank 75,125 0.229 0.589 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Participant-borrower relationship  Bank 75,125 0.078 0.268 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bank similarity (SIC2) Bank 64,514 0.388 0.162 0.283 0.374 0.468 
Maturity Loan 75,125 3.823 0.671 3.584 4.094 4.190 
Facility amount Loan 75,125 4.513 1.787 3.350 4.605 5.784 
Downgrading Loan 75,125 0.126 0.331 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Performance pricing Loan 75,125 0.260 0.439 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Collateral Loan 75,125 0.459 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Guarantee Loan 75,125 0.057 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel C: Summary Statistics for Punished and Non-Punished Lead Arrangers 





(B) – (A)  
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean 
Lead lender shares (%) 17.377 16.362 12.500 27.036 27.670 16.667 9.658*** 
HHI (%) 15.805 15.709 11.111 25.003 26.661 14.286 9.197*** 







The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead lenders. 
We estimate the regression: S = af + a1 PELb,t + a2Ll,t + uf,b,l,t, where b 
refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms and t for years. We estimate this regression 
on a loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. S represents the syndicate 
loan structure and is reported defined in the second line. PEL (post enforcement 
loan) is the main explanatory and is defined as a dummy taking the value one 
for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of the enforcement 
and zero for loans originated before the date of the enforcement action or for 
all loans originated by lead banks that were never punished during our sample 
period. All variables are defined in Table I. All regressions include fixed effects 
as shown in the lower part of the table and the standard errors are clustered by 
firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1% level, respectively.  
  I II III 
Dependent variable: Lead lender  HHI (%) Number of  
  shares (%)   lenders 
Post enforcement loan 2.101*** 1.723*** -1.143**  
[3.621] [2.957] [-2.375] 
Maturity -2.492*** -2.095*** 0.399***  
[-7.069] [-7.027] [4.438] 
Facility amount -0.957*** -1.290*** 0.383***  
[-4.617] [-5.947] [5.072] 
Downgrading 0.256 0.563 0.677  
[0.209] [0.591] [1.535] 
Performance pricing -8.050*** -7.617*** 2.553***  
[-12.843] [-12.463] [5.932] 
Collateral -5.512*** -3.867*** 1.436***  
[-6.062] [-5.371] [6.386] 
Lead-borrower relationship -8.663*** -7.104*** 1.699***  
[-6.887] [-8.049] [4.370] 
Observations 75,556 75,556 75,556 
Adjusted R-squared 0.852 0.860 0.745 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes 






Results from Fixed Effects Models 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead lenders. We estimate the regression: S = af +
a1 PELb,t + a2Ll,t + uf,b,l,t, where b refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms and t for years. We estimate this regression on a 
loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. S represents the syndicate loan structure and is reported defined in the 
second line. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory and is defined as a dummy taking the value one for loans 
originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of the enforcement and zero for loans originated before the date of the 
enforcement action or for all loans originated by lead banks that were never punished during our sample period. All 
variables are defined in Table I. All regressions include fixed effects as shown in the lower part of the table and the standard 
errors are clustered by firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
I II III IV V VI 
Dependent variable: Lead lender  
shares (%) 








Post enforcement loan 2.910*** 2.559*** -1.082*** 0.064** 0.125** -0.207  
[3.186] [2.888] [-3.103] [2.526] [2.350] [-0.153] 
Maturity -2.492*** -2.150*** 0.662*** 0.013 0.003 -0.750*  
[-7.141] [-7.442] [6.771] [1.243] [0.381] [-1.791] 
Facility amount -0.807*** -1.134*** 0.773*** 0.004 0.003 -0.949***  
[-4.356] [-5.877] [6.866] [1.001] [1.066] [-4.436] 
Downgrading 0.137 0.531 0.619** 0.034 0.030 -1.148  
[0.111] [0.545] [2.420] [0.897] [0.800] [-1.638] 
Performance pricing -7.586*** -7.111*** 3.214*** 0.527*** 0.494*** -6.165***  
[-11.953] [-11.513] [9.700] [12.477] [14.834] [-8.175] 
Collateral -5.361*** -3.647*** 1.078*** 0.555*** 0.551*** -1.874**  
[-6.017] [-5.457] [4.117] [8.426] [10.788] [-2.084] 
Lead-borrower relationship -8.267*** -6.430*** 0.620*** 0.066 0.114*** -0.856 
 [-6.373] [-7.997] [4.672] [1.424] [2.639] [-1.337] 
Observations 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.855 0.864 0.567 0.932 0.956 0.847 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 








Including firm*lead bank*year fixed effects 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead lenders. We estimate the regression: S = af +
a1 PELb,t + a2Ll,t + uf,b,l,t, where b refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms and t for years. We estimate this regression on 
a loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. S represents the syndicate loan structure and is reported defined in 
the second line. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory and is defined as a dummy taking the value one 
for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of the enforcement and zero for loans originated before the 
date of the enforcement action or for all loans originated by lead banks that were never punished during our sample 
period. All variables are defined in Table I. All regressions include fixed effects as shown in the lower part of the table 
and the standard errors are clustered by firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1% level, respectively.  
I II III IV V VI 
Dependent variable: Lead lender  
shares (%) 








Post enforcement loan 3.086*** 2.704*** -1.024* 0.040** 0.171** 0.902  
[3.305] [3.024] [-1.834] [2.249] [2.185] [1.431] 
Maturity -2.194*** -1.939*** 0.389*** 0.021** 0.008 -0.278  
[-6.844] [-6.917] [4.711] [2.002] [1.198] [-1.030] 
Facility amount -0.860*** -1.200*** 0.274*** 0.003 0.002 -0.243*  
[-4.428] [-5.947] [4.027] [0.742] [0.865] [-1.839] 
Downgrading 0.391 0.772 0.631 0.038 0.033 0.237  
[0.322] [0.827] [1.574] [1.029] [0.932] [0.231] 
Performance pricing -7.708*** -7.295*** 2.031*** 0.414*** 0.410*** -5.057***  
[-12.340] [-11.990] [4.643] [8.054] [9.295] [-4.935] 
Collateral -5.428*** -3.822*** 1.424*** 0.497*** 0.485*** -1.800*  
[-6.255] [-5.654] [4.821] [6.214] [8.156] [-1.674] 
Lead-borrower relationship -8.368*** -6.252*** 1.085** -0.019 0.085 0.290  
[-6.291] [-7.875] [2.076] [-0.323] [1.569] [0.203] 
Observations 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.854 0.863 0.673 0.965 0.964 0.946 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm*Lead Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Sensitivity Tests on the Fixed Effects Model 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead lenders. We estimate the 
regression: 𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 + 𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where b refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms 
and t for years. We estimate this regression on a loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. 
S is defined as the lead lender shares (%) and represents the syndicate loan structure. PEL (post 
enforcement loan) is the main explanatory and is defined as a dummy taking the value one for 
loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of the enforcement and zero for loans 
originated before the date of the enforcement action or for all loans originated by lead banks that 
were never punished during our sample period. All variables are defined in Table I. All regressions 
include fixed effects as shown in the lower part of the table and the standard errors are clustered 
by firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
  I II III IV 










Post enforcement loan 1.212*** 0.452 3.767*** 3.831**  
[3.006] [1.153] [6.205] [2.257] 
Maturity 0.006 -0.436*** -3.237*** -2.362***  
[0.012] [-2.878] [-9.224] [-3.004] 
Facility amount -0.401*** 0.003 -2.213*** -0.725***  
[-7.058] [0.028] [-7.769] [-5.118] 
Downgrading 0.287 0.612* -1.707** -1.347  
[0.647] [1.868] [-2.324] [-1.494] 
Performance pricing -3.153*** -2.064*** -7.283*** -7.194***  
[-7.647] [-5.120] [-10.989] [-15.459] 
Collateral -1.604** -0.584 -2.920*** -2.801  
[-2.749] [-0.739] [-4.304] [-1.635] 
Lead-borrower 
relationship 
-1.753** -1.767*** -2.902*** -2.401 
 
[-2.425] [-2.868] [-6.968] [-1.015] 
Observations 5,605 75,125 74,883 8,954 
Adjusted R-squared 0.848 0.782 0.752 0.850 
Loan purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 







A Role for Bank Size or the Financial Crisis? 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead lenders. We estimate 
the regression: 𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 + 𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where b refers to bank; l for loans, f for 
firms and t for years. We estimate this regression on a loan-level sample originated from 1997 
to 2014. S represents the syndicate loan structure and is reported defined in the second line. 
PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory and is defined as a dummy taking the 
value one for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of the enforcement and 
zero for loans originated before the date of the enforcement action or for all loans originated by 
lead banks that were never punished during our sample period. All variables are defined in 
Table I. All regressions include fixed effects as shown in the lower part of the table and the 
standard errors are clustered by firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  I II III IV 








Post enforcement loan 3.114*** 3.022*** 2.547*** 3.117***  
[3.040] [2.928] [2.711] [3.455] 
Bank size  -1.510   
  [-1.004]   
Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank controls Yes Yes No No 
Observations 81,040 81,040 30,647 44,478 
Adjusted R-squared 0.634 0.627 0.868 0.832 
Loan purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes No No 
Bank*Year FE No No Yes Yes 





Results from the Treatment Effects Model 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead lenders. We estimate the regression: 𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 +
𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where b refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms and t for years. We estimate this regression 
on using a two-stage treatment effects model with loan-level frequency originated from 1997 to 2014. S represents the 
syndicate loan structure and is reported defined in the second line. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory 
and is defined as a dummy taking the value one for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of the 
enforcement and zero for loans originated before the date of the enforcement action or for all loans originated by lead 
banks that were never punished during our sample period. In the first stage (Panel A), we use the share of female 
examiners in local supervisory offices as an instrument to enforcement actions, while we control for risk-based capital 
ratio, non-performing loans, non-interest income, bank ROA, liquidity, and bank size. In Panel B, we report the second-
stage results. All variables are defined in Table I. In the lower part of the table, we report the results from instrument 
validity tests (Adj. R-squared and Chi-squared), as described in the text. All regressions include fixed effects as shown 
in the lower part of the table and the standard errors are clustered by firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: First-stage results 
Female examiners 1.213*** 
 [3.432] 
Bank controls Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.227 
 
Panel B: Second-stage results 
 I II III IV V VI 
Dependent variable: Lead lender  
shares (%) 








Post enforcement loan 3.517*** 1.340*** -1.195*** 0.077*** 0.163** -0.197 
 
[3.195] [4.991] [-2.910] [2.610] [2.407] [-0.120] 
Maturity -3.450*** -4.306*** 0.820*** 0.097*** 0.005 -0.920** 
 
[-11.516] [-8.980] [6.328] [4.592] [0.397] [-2.071] 
Facility amount -1.316*** -1.602*** 0.794*** -0.014 0.003 -1.125*** 
 
[-7.014] [-5.303] [7.311] [-1.373] [0.826] [-4.738] 
Downgrading 0.713 0.913 0.548* 0.351*** 0.042 -1.246 
 
[1.207] [1.309] [1.855] [6.687] [0.907] [-1.429] 
Performance pricing -9.105*** -3.673*** 3.385*** 0.608*** 0.524*** -7.943*** 
 
[-14.716] [-2.962] [10.020] [13.352] [13.820] [-11.685] 
Collateral -2.125*** -3.866*** 0.946*** 0.833*** 0.497*** -0.173 
 
[-3.047] [-4.660] [3.764] [3.731] [8.299] [-0.072] 
Lead-borrower relationship -3.416*** -5.232*** 0.652*** 0.076 0.128*** -0.745 
[-7.305] [-4.714] [4.741] [1.596] [2.790] [-1.420] 
Observations 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 
Adj. R-squared of 
instrument test 
0.00007 0.00011 0.00008 0.00007 0.00015 0.00023 
Chi-squared of instrument 
test (P-value) 
0.623 0.517 0.640 0.711 0.416 0.329 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Additional Elements of Syndicated Loan Structure 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). We estimate the regression: 𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 + 𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 +
𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where b refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms and t for years. We estimate this regression on a 
loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. S represents the syndicate loan structure and is reported 
defined in the second line. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory and is defined as a dummy 
taking the value one for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of the enforcement and zero 
for loans originated before the date of the enforcement action or for all loans originated by lead banks that were 
never punished during our sample period. All variables are defined in Table I. All regressions include fixed 
effects as shown in the lower part of the table and the standard errors are clustered by firm and bank. The *, 
**, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  I II III IV 
Dependent variable  # of participants # of lead 
lenders 
# of foreign 
participants 
Deal amount 
held by lead 
($M) 
Post enforcement loan -0.969** -0.036** -0.204** 0.074*  
[-2.549] [-2.037] [-2.132] [1.814] 
Maturity 0.222*** 0.024 0.194*** -0.078***  
[4.707] [1.214] [4.137] [-4.915] 
Facility amount 0.141*** 0.026*** 0.152*** 0.972***  
[5.645] [3.625] [3.498] [116.489] 
Downgrading -0.013 -0.079 -0.017 0.001  
[-0.060] [-1.443] [-0.064] [0.024] 
Performance pricing 1.756*** 0.112*** 1.479*** -0.202***  
[10.792] [2.896] [7.055] [-5.179] 
Collateral 0.408*** 0.027 0.399*** -0.198***  
[4.469] [0.773] [3.808] [-6.470] 
Lead-borrower relationship 0.535*** 0.040 0.420** -0.285***  
[3.550] [0.399] [2.499] [-5.287] 
Observations 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.812 0.936 0.870 0.754 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Logit Results for Participant 
The table reports marginal coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) for a logit model with fixed effects. We 





. We define the “potential” 
participant set as all banks that were acting at least once as participants in the syndicated loan market over (i) 
the whole sample period or (ii) in the last five years. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory and 
is defined as a dummy taking the value one for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of the 
enforcement and zero for loans originated before the date of the enforcement action or for all loans originated 
by lead banks that were never punished during our sample period. All variables are defined in Table I. All 
regressions include fixed effects as shown in the lower part of the table and the standard errors are clustered by 
firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  I II III IV 
  Full sample Last 5 years Full sample Last 5 years 
Post enforcement loan -0.105** -0.099** -0.033*** -0.060***  
[-2.382] [-1.984] [-5.931] [-8.710] 
Maturity 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.039***  
[6.394] [5.836] [30.696] [27.234] 
Facility amount 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.081*** 0.084***  
[9.221] [9.337] [147.640] [138.368] 
Downgrading 0.013 0.011 0.017*** 0.014***  
[1.412] [1.161] [8.893] [6.936] 
Performance pricing 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.054*** 0.054***  
[8.706] [8.225] [31.625] [27.988] 
Collateral -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.013***  
[-2.982] [-2.749] [-8.983] [-7.001] 
Participant-borrower 
relationship 
0.040*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 
[3.595] [4.084] [26.740] [27.200] 
Observations 295,207 233,084 295,017 232,903 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No No Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes Yes 






The Role of Variables Mitigating Informational Asymmetry 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead lenders. We 
estimate the regression: 𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 + 𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where b refers to bank; l 
for loans, f for firms and t for years. We estimate this regression on a loan-level sample 
originated from 1997 to 2014. S represents the syndicate loan structure and is reported 
defined in the second line. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory and is 
defined as a dummy taking the value one for loans originated by a punished lead bank after 
the date t of the enforcement and zero for loans originated before the date of the 
enforcement action or for all loans originated by lead banks that were never punished 
during our sample period. All variables are defined in Table I. All regressions include fixed 
effects as shown in the lower part of the table and the standard errors are clustered by firm 
and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
  I II III 
Post enforcement loan  3.893** 4.490*** 1.834*** 
 
[2.254] [5.095] [3.192] 












Post enforcement loan * General covenants 
  
-1.367*** 
   
[-3.109] 
Maturity -2.355*** -2.960*** -2.526*** 
 
[-2.997] [-10.126] [-7.251] 
Facility amount -0.722*** -2.405*** -0.966*** 
 
[-4.895] [-8.333] [-4.632] 
Downgrading -1.388 -2.066*** 0.268 
 
[-1.534] [-2.969] [0.220] 
Performance pricing -7.208*** -8.825*** -7.505*** 
 
[-15.737] [-16.055] [-13.053] 
Collateral -2.860 -3.653*** -4.470*** 
 
[-1.628] [-4.793] [-4.630] 
Lead-borrower relationship -2.343 -2.876*** -8.636*** 
 
[-0.984] [-6.814] [-6.899] 
Marginal effect of post enforcement loan -0.488 1.428 0.467 
(P-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 75,125 75,125 75,125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.850 0.716 0.852 
Loan purpose FE Yes Yes Yes 
Loan type FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 







The Role of Relationship Lending in Mitigating Informational Asymmetry 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead lenders. We estimate the 
regression: 𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 + 𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where b refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms and t for 
years. We estimate this regression on a loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. S represents the 
syndicate loan structure and is reported defined in the second line. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the 
main explanatory and is defined as a dummy taking the value one for loans originated by a punished lead 
bank after the date t of the enforcement and zero for loans originated before the date of the enforcement 
action or for all loans originated by lead banks that were never punished during our sample period. All 
variables are defined in Table I. All regressions include fixed effects as shown in the lower part of the 
table and the standard errors are clustered by firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 







Post enforcement loan 2.239*** 2.605*** 2.643***  
[2.863] [3.102] [3.283] 
Relationship lending -4.217*** -8.273*** -8.263***  
[-4.419] [-4.698] [-4.715] 
Post enforcement loan * Relationship lending -0.857** -0.936* -0.432**  
[-1.977] [-1.788] [-2.226] 
Maturity -2.528*** -2.480*** -2.482***  
[-7.680] [-6.326] [-6.443] 
Facility amount -1.204*** -0.806*** -0.806***  
[-6.285] [-2.852] [-2.841] 
Downgrading 1.082 0.139 0.139  
[1.169] [0.093] [0.092] 
Performance pricing -7.891*** -7.563*** -7.567***  
[-13.435] [-10.146] [-10.118] 
Collateral -4.839*** -5.338*** -5.343***  
[-5.731] [-5.826] [-5.691] 
Marginal effect of post enforcement loan 1.382 1.669 2.211 
(P-value) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 75,125 75,125 75,125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.904 0.905 0.905 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes 







Evolution of Enforcement Actions  
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead lenders. We estimate the regression: 𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 +
𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where b refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms and t for years. We estimate this regression 
on a loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. S is defined as the lead lender shares (%) and represents the 
syndicate loan structure. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory and is defined as a dummy taking the 
value one for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of the enforcement and zero for loans originated 
before the date of the enforcement action or for all loans originated by lead banks that were never punished during 
our sample period. All variables are defined in Table I. Columns I-II are estimated for the full sample. Columns III-
IV are estimated on banks subsample with profitability above the mean. All regressions include fixed effects as shown 
in the lower part of the table and the standard errors are clustered by firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  I II III IV 
 
Full sample More Profitable firms 








Post enforcement loan 2.258** 2.120* 2.984*** 2.841***  
[2.037] [1.908] [3.820] [3.720] 
Post enforcement loan * Bank ROA 
  
-2.552*** -2.614***    
[-2.688] [-2.881] 




Loan controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 75,125 75,125 26,796 48,329 
Adjusted R-squared 0.855 0.855 0.896 0.896 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Appendix I. Reputation and Loan Syndicate Structure: A Formal Argument 
In this Appendix, we formulate a theoretical argument that stresses the role of reputation of the 
lead arranger in the structure of a loan syndicate, with reputation emerging from a regulator’s 
decision in whether or not to enact an enforcement action. The equilibrium outcome of our 
model yields the prediction of our testable hypothesis discussed in Section II. 
The set of players is given by {B, A, P}, where B is the borrower (firm), A is the lead 
(principal) arranger (the bank that designs the contract), and P is the potential participant (the 
bank that is offered the contract).19  
 The borrower wants to finance a project that costs one dollar but lacks funds. Hence, 
he requests financing from the principal arranger. The principal arranger might want to (i) lend 
the borrower the entire amount, (ii) partially finance the project herself, or (iii) not finance the 
project at all. In the first case, she provides a loan of one dollar to the borrower. In the second, 
she asks another potential participant to participate in providing the borrower a syndicate loan 
of one dollar. In the third case, she turns down the borrower’s loan application. If the loan 
(individual or syndicate) is approved, the lead arranger monitors the use of the borrower’s 
funds. 
 The timing of the game is as follows: 
Stage 1. The borrower applies for a loan of one dollar at a fixed interest rate, r, to finance a 
project. 
Stage 2. If the principal arranger does not want to finance this project at all, the game ends 
here. If the principal arranger wants to finance the project (even partially), the principal 
arranger writes a contract (𝑎𝐴, 𝑎𝑃) such that 𝑎𝐴 + 𝑎𝑃 = 1 and 𝑎𝑖 ≥ 0 for every 𝑖 ∈ {𝐴, 𝑃}. We 
use 𝑎𝑖 to denote the participation share of player i in the loan (the share of the loan that this 
                                                 
19 We assume that an arbitrary number of potential participants provides no additional intuition to our analysis 




player finances). Given that 𝑎𝑃 = 1 − 𝑎𝐴, we usually refer to a loan contract only by the share 
held by the lead arranger.  
Stage 3. The potential participant observes the contract and decides whether or not to sign it. 
We consider a contract approved if the potential participant signs the contract. 
Stage 4. If the contract is not approved, the game ends here (no loan is given). If the contract 
is approved, the project is financed and the principal arranger decides how much monitoring 
effort to exert. 
Stage 5. The returns of the project are made public information. 
Stage 6. Players receive their payoffs. 
 The project’s success is subject to uncertainty. Formally, we assume that the project’s 
quality will be the outcome of a random draw from a uniform distribution on [0, s(e)], where 
𝑠(𝑒) = 𝑠 + 𝑒.20 Parameter 𝑠 ≥ 1 + 𝑟 can be viewed as the project’s inherent success potential, 
and it is assumed to be common information, while 𝑒 ≥ 0 measures the lead arranger’s 
monitoring effort. The larger the lead arranger’s monitoring effort, the larger the project’s 
success prospects. Therefore, a potential participant would like the principal arranger to exert 
as much monitoring effort as possible. We stress, however, that there is no third party that can 
enforce any level of monitoring effort, and hence the monitoring effort that the principal 
arranger will exert after the loan is approved cannot be part of the contract. This scenario 
represents a possible source of moral hazard, and the principal arranger must form rational 
expectations about it based on the information available to her.  
 If the project is financed and its quality turns out to be 𝛾 ≥ 1 + 𝑟, then the payoff of 
the borrower is 1, the payoff of the lead arranger is 𝑣(𝑎𝐴(1 + 𝑟), 𝑎𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑒), and the payoff of 
                                                 
20 The uniform distribution is just an auxiliary device that greatly simplifies analysis and has no substantial 
implication on our findings. Indeed, what is vital for our results, is that the project's success probability is 
increasing in the monitoring effort of the principal arranger. The precise way that one chooses to model this 
outcome through a distribution is essentially inconsequential as far as the main structure of the underlying 




the potential participant is 𝑣(𝑎𝑃(1 + 𝑟), 𝑎𝑃) + 𝑎𝑃𝑞𝐴. In contrast, if the project quality turns out 
to be 𝛾 < 1 + 𝑟, then the payoff of the borrower is 0, the payoff of the principal arranger is 
𝑣(0, 𝑎𝐴) − 𝑐(𝑒), and the payoff of the potential participant is 𝑣(0, 𝑎𝑃) + 𝑎𝑃𝑞𝐴, where 𝑞𝐴 ∈
{−𝑞, 𝑞} for some 𝑞 > 0. To make the analysis easier to follow, we consider that 𝑣(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑥 −
𝑦𝜉, where 𝜉 > 1 and that 𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑥2. We stress though that all our qualitative findings are 
robust to more general formulations.21 
 The parameter 𝑞𝐴 approximates the characteristics of player A—and it is hence known 
to A—that affect the potential participant’s willingness to do business with A, but 𝑞𝐴 need not 
be known to the potential participant. When the potential participant is unaware of the 
particular value of 𝑞𝐴, we consider that she believes that its value is –q with probability ½ and 
q with probability ½. When there is no uncertainty, 𝑞𝐴 takes one of the two admissible values. 
This parameter can be interpreted as the reputational risk of doing business with A.  
 In this study, we closely link the lead arranger’s reputation with the regulator’s signal 
on the lead arranger’s compliance with regulatory law on the books. Specifically, if a principal 
arranger has recently been audited by the regulator and found to have engaged in legal or 
regulatory misconduct, then she receives an enforcement action that is publicly announced. It 
is then natural to assume that 𝑞𝐴 is known and takes the value –q. This implies that potential 
participants incur costs by forming loan syndicates with principal arrangers with bad 
reputations (i.e., those punished by the regulator).  
 On the other hand, when A has been audited and found to comply with laws and 
regulations, then 𝑞𝐴 is also known but takes the value q. This essentially implies that potential 
participants gain reputation by associating with principal arrangers with good reputations. 
                                                 
21 For example, we can replicate the analysis considering general forms of u and c—for our results to hold, it is 
essential that the lead arranger’s expected utility is strictly concave in the size of her share and that c is strictly 
convex in effort—without adding anything to the intuition that we obtain from analyzing the current specification. 




Finally, when little is known regarding 𝑞𝐴, we can assume that the potential participant assigns 
equal probability to any of the two eventualities, which is identical to conducting business with 
a principal arranger of intermediate reputation.  
 Overall, we consider that reputational risk is proportional to the degree of association. 
If the potential participant contributes a small (large) amount to a loan designed by A, it 
undertakes little (great) reputational risks associated with this loan. This relationship is the 
reason why we multiply 𝑞𝐴 with 𝑎𝑃 in the payoff of P. 
 Because this is a game of incomplete (the monitoring effort exerted by the principal 
arranger is unobservable) and asymmetric (the principal arranger is better informed about 𝑞𝐴 
than the potential participant) information, the natural solution concept is a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium (PBE). For a proper characterization of such an equilibrium, one should identify a 
profile of players’ strategies along with a consistent system of beliefs such that Bayes’ rule is 
applied whenever possible. To investigate how a PBE should look like in this framework, we 
start by focusing on the fourth stage of the game. 
 After a contract (𝑎𝐴, 𝑎𝑃) is approved in stage 3, the last decision of the game occurs in 
stage 4: The principal arranger decides how much monitoring effort to exert. Given our 









}.   (A.1) 
Equation (A.1) simply amounts to the lead arranger deciding 𝑒 ≥ 0 in order to maximize her 
expected payoff, given that the contract (𝑎𝐴, 𝑎𝑃) was approved. Simple algebra establishes 
that, for any positive participation share on behalf of the principal arranger, 𝑎𝐴 > 0, there exists 
a unique interior solution 𝑒∗ > 0, which is characterized by 
2𝑒∗(𝑒∗ + 𝑠)2 = 𝑎𝐴(1 + 𝑟)
2     (A.2) 












> 0.     (A.3) 
  
Observation 1: All else constant, the principal arranger’s monitoring effort, and subsequently 
the project’s cumulative success potential, strictly increases along with the principal arranger’s 
participation share, 𝑎𝐴. 
  
 Observation 1 is quite intuitive, because the principal arranger has much greater 
incentive to improve the project’s success potential when she has financed a large part of it 
compared with when she holds only a small part of the loan. To study what happens in the 
contract design stage, we put forward a formal assumption regarding when the potential 
participant signs a proposed contract and when she declines. 
 
Assumption 1: We assume that the potential participant signs the contract if and only if her 
expected payoff from doing so is larger than investing the same amount of money in an outside 
option with success probability 𝑤 ∈ (0,1). 
 
 Taking into account that the only reasonable expectations regarding the monitoring 
effort that A will exert in the fourth stage of the game are uniquely defined for every admissible 
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(1 + 𝑟)] 𝑑𝛾 + 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) ≥ 𝑤(1 + 𝑟)
𝑠+𝑒∗(𝑠,𝑎𝐴,𝑟)
1+𝑟
    (A.6) 
or 
 𝑎𝐴 ∈ {0,1}.       (A.7) 
 This maximization problem is well defined and hence always admits a unique 
solution—that is, we always have a unique equilibrium. When 𝑎𝐴
∗ = 0, no contract is offered, 
and when 𝑎𝐴
∗ = 1, the principal arranger finances the whole project (so approval of the contract 
by any other potential participant is unnecessary). Thus only the case in which 𝑎𝐴
∗ ∈ (0,1) is 
interesting. Notice that the syndicate loan case 𝑎𝐴
∗ ∈ (0,1) is generic: When s is larger than 1 +
𝑟, but not excessively large, then the principal arranger wants to finance part of the project; and 
when w is sufficiently small, then the potential participant is willing to participate too. When 
𝑎𝐴
∗ ∈ (0,1), the constraint could be binding or not.  
 The question of interest relates to the comparative statics of this solution with respect 
to a discrete variable, namely 𝐸(𝑞𝐴). Notice that 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) ∈ {−𝑞, 0, 𝑞} because either P knows 
the value of 𝑞𝐴—and hence we have either 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = −𝑞 or 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = 𝑞—or she does not, in 
which case we have 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = 0. In other words, P either knows or does not know whether A 
has been subject to an enforcement action.  
 Consider first that 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = 0 and that the solution, 𝑎𝐴










  (A.8) 
and the equilibrium contract, 𝑎𝐴
∗ , is characterized by 
𝑠 + 𝑒∗(𝑠, 𝑎𝐴











Intuitively, this case is not as interesting from a real-world viewpoint because enforcement 
actions are public information.22 
 So what happens if we keep everything constant but change the value of 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) from 
zero to –q? In that case, if the constraint is still satisfied when computed for the initial contract, 
𝑎𝐴
∗ , then the equilibrium contract should remain identical to the initial one. This is because in 
such a case, the solution should coincide with the principal arranger's ideal contract, ?̂?𝐴 
(understood as the solution of the principal arranger's unconstrained maximization problem). 
As we saw earlier, this ideal contract never depends on the exact value of 𝐸(𝑞𝐴). 
 Because 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) changes from zero to a negative value, however, it might be the case 
that the contract, 𝑎𝐴









,  (A.10) 
which suggests that the new solution, 𝑎𝐴









.  (A.11) 













 > 0. (A.12) 
In other words, the constraint can switch from being not binding to being binding if and only 
if 𝑎𝐴
∗∗ > 𝑎𝐴
∗ . The intuition is clear: When the reputational risks increase because of the 
enactment of an enforcement action (𝐸(𝑞𝐴) jumps from zero to –q), a potential participant 
either still finds the principal arranger's initial contract, 𝑎𝐴
∗ , appealing enough to sign it or she 
refuses to sign unless the principal arranger increases the project's success probability and 
hence compensates for the extra reputational risk that P now undertakes. The only way that A 
                                                 
22 There are certain informal enforcement actions imposed on banks that are not made public, which we discuss 
below. One can also think of the special case where 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = 0 as when participants only suspect that a principal 




can credibly commit to increasing the project's success probability is by taking a larger share 
of the loan herself, thus increasing her incentive to exert more monitoring effort after the 
contract is signed. Of course, if q is very large, then we could have that 𝑎𝐴
∗∗ = 0 (i.e., no contract 
is offered), because it might be impossible for A to propose a deal that is both profitable for her 
and good enough for P to participate. But for non-extreme values of q, one should expect A to 
propose a contract with a strictly larger 𝑎𝐴.  
 Now consider that 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) = 0 and that the solution, 𝑎𝐴
∗ , is such that the constraint is 
binding. It is obvious that if we change the value of 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) from zero to –q, then it cannot be 
the case this constraint still holds for the same contract. The arguments presented above should 
make clear that in this case, the new solution, 𝑎𝐴
∗∗, is such that the left-hand side of Equation 
(A.11) is equal to q and, hence, 𝑎𝐴
∗∗ > 𝑎𝐴
∗ . Again, all these are conditional on q not being 
extremely large, because in such case we could have 𝑎𝐴
∗∗ = 0. Hence, again, the principal 
arranger reacts to a decrease in 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) by taking a larger share of the loan in order to commit 
herself to do more to improve the loan's success potential. 
 All the above hold for any decrease in 𝐸(𝑞𝐴), not just for changes from zero to –q. 
Symmetric arguments guarantee that an increase in 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) (for example, a change from zero to 
q) will cause A either to decrease the share of the loan that she finances or to leave the contract 
unchanged. 
 
Observation 2: All else constant, a decrease (increase) in 𝐸(𝑞𝐴) induces an increase (decrease) 










Capital adequacy and liquidity, asset quality, provisions and 
reserves, large exposures and exposures to related parties 
2 
Internal control and audit systems, money laundering, bank secrecy, 
consumer protection and foreign assets control 
3 
Breaches of the requirements concerning the fitness and propriety 
of banks’ board members and senior management, as well as other 
persons closely associated with banks (institution affiliated parties) 
 
Each of the three main regulators in the U.S. has its own system to categorize enforcement 
actions. For example, the Federal Reserve lists seven types of enforcement actions 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/enforcementactions/search.aspx), the OCC also lists 
seven types but these are not precisely the same (http://www.occ.gov/topics/laws-
regulations/enforcement-actions/enforcement-actions-types.html), and the FDIC lists 28 types 
(https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/edoaction.html).  
 In this paper, we aim to first and foremost distinguish between the enforcement actions 
that are significant enough to have a bearing on the reputation of the bank and, by extension, 
to its partnerships. We suggest that the best possible categorization for our objective reflects 
the internal taxonomy of the so-called “prudential requirements” as set out in the Basel 
Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Basel, 2012). These 
enforcement actions are very closely related to safety and soundness issues and, according to 
the recent study of Delis et al. (2017b), are the only ones with a direct impact on the risk-taking 
behavior of banks. Thus, these are the enforcement actions that are important enough to 
essentially matter as a device affecting reputation.  
 We identify three such types of enforcement actions as reflected in Table A.I. The first 
type covers capital adequacy, asset quality, loan-loss provisions and reserves, large exposures 




of Type 1 actions in Table A.I. These actions are very closely linked to safety and soundness 
issues and, thus, potentially have a large impact on the reputation of the punished banks.   
 A second group of enforcement actions (Type 2) concerns the robustness of internal 
organization procedures, such as internal control and audit systems, as well as management 
information and risk management arrangements. All of these procedures are clearly defined in 
Basel’s Principles 14-15, 26, as very important procedures mirroring safety and soundness 
issues, even though not as directly as the procedures yielding Type 1 enforcement actions. Still, 
the robustness and functionality of these internal procedures are quite important for the 
reputation of banks and this is why we include them in our analysis. 
 Formal enforcement actions against board members, senior management, and persons 
closely connected with the bank (institution-affiliated parties) comprise the Type 3 
enforcement actions used in our analysis. These actions mainly cover instances of professional 
incompetence, fraud, and insider abuse. The reason we include these actions in our analysis is 
that they tend to hit the news and, thus, potentially have a reputational impact. However, the 
association of such enforcement actions with financial safety and soundness could be relatively 
weak, for several reasons: (a) supervisors are heavily oriented towards addressing concerns 
regarding the safety and soundness of ailing banks per se (“institutional enforcement”) and, as 
a consequence, they give the greatest priority to Type 1 and Type 2 actions rather than to actions 
against individuals or other institution-affiliated parties; (b) investigation and successful 
prosecution of fraud and insider abuse cases is extremely complex and time consuming (e.g., 
involves massive and complicated transactions, records may be poor or even nonexistent, the 
effect of white-collar crimes may appear with substantial delays), which also undermines the 
effectiveness of the relevant actions regarding financial safety and soundness; (c) internal 
organization inefficiencies lie behind the development of fraud, insider abuse, or even 




already captured by the Type 2 formal enforcement actions arguments (Brunmeier and 
Willardson, 2006; GAO, 1989/4). For these reasons we also conduct sensitivity analysis 
without Type 3 enforcement actions (i.e., including only the Basel-related Type 1 and Type 2 
actions) and show that our results do not change.   
 There are of course many other types of enforcement actions, which are excluded from 
our analysis. These can be actions for typical infringements of laws, including, Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act and Flood Insurance Act, penalties assessed against a banking organization for 
the late filing of call reports, denials of acquisition of control for individual managers, denials 
of section 19 applications (which are only available after 2008), prohibitions to open up new 
branches, and orders requiring banks to reimburse customers for violations of consumer 
protection laws. For details, see FDIC’s website provided above. Evidently, these penalties 
would encompass actions with considerably heterogeneous underlying cause and would be 
very remotely related to financial safety and soundness of banks. On this line, we do not expect 
that these enforcement actions would have any serious reputational effect and thus we exclude 





Appendix III. Sub-sample only for punished banks 
In this Appendix we report results using a sub-sample only for punished banks that received a 
sanction during our sample period. In all specifications, the effect of the enforcement action on 
various measures of syndicate structure in the first year after the enactment is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (except column III which is at 5% level) for the most important 
dependent variables) The results in column I show that an enforcement action increases the 
lead lender’s share in the syndicate by approximately 3.5 percentage points. For the lead lender 
with an average share (equal to 19.3% in our sample), this finding implies a very large increase 
of approximately 23.3%. A very similar picture appears when using as our dependent variables 
the HHI (%) of the loan syndicate and the number of lenders. Thus, although there is a decrease 
in the number of lenders that participate in a loan syndicate when the lead arranger receives an 
enforcement action, the most significant effect comes from the lead arranger taking up a larger 
share of the loan. 
 
Table A.II 
Results only for punished banks 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for punished lead lenders. We estimate the 
regression: 𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 + 𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where b refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms and t for years. 
We estimate this regression on a loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. S represents the syndicate 
loan structure and is reported defined in the second line. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory 
and is defined as a dummy taking the value one for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of 
the enforcement and zero for loans originated before the date of the enforcement action. All variables are 
defined in Table I. All regressions include fixed effects as shown in the lower part of the table and the standard 
errors are clustered by firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
  I II III 
Dependent variable: Lead lender HHI (%) Number of 
  shares (%)   lenders 
Post enforcement loan 3.554*** 2.731*** -0.647**  
[7.603] [7.173] [-2.388] 
Maturity -3.645*** -3.408*** 0.763***  
[-16.065] [-14.272] [27.564] 
Facility amount -0.851*** -1.124*** 0.297***  
[-33.524] [-23.142] [9.040] 
Downgrading 1.303** 2.362*** -1.900***  
[2.505] [3.543] [-9.875] 
Performance pricing -5.293*** -5.766*** 1.533***  




Collateral -1.415 -0.558 2.627***  
[-1.438] [-0.857] [9.904] 
Lead-borrower Relationship -1.142*** -1.986*** 0.006  
[-3.404] [-4.032] [0.043] 
Observations 2,562 2,562 2,060 
Adjusted R-squared 0.750 0.772 0.508 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank effects Yes Yes Yes 






Appendix IV. Use of Fixed Effects 
In this appendix, intended for online use only, we provide an example to show why the 
estimation of equation (13) with bank*year fixed effects does not yield perfect collinearity 
between these fixed effects and PEL. Consider the data set attached in the Table below, which 
replicates the structure of our actual data set. There are 6 banks, each issuing a number of loans 
over 6 years. There are 33 loans, each issued by at least two lead banks: observations 1 to 33 
reflect the first lead banks of each loan and observations 34 to 66 reflect the second lead banks. 
The first lead banks 2 and 3 have received enforcement actions in years 2 and 4, respectively. 
The second lead banks 5 and 6 have received enforcement actions in years 2 and 3, respectively. 
The column S denotes the share (in percentage) of each lead bank in the loan.  
 If we use observations 1 to 33 with bank*year fixed effects, PEL drops out due to 
perfect collinearity. In Stata, this comes from the commands: 
egen by=group(Bank Year) 
reghdfe S PEL, a(by) 
This is irrespective of the sample size: indeed one can increase the sample size of our example 
and PEL will still drop out simply because PEL is a bank*year variable. However, adding a 
second lead bank in the observations 34-66, that received an enforcement action in a different 
year compared to the first lead bank, means that identification can be obtained from the 
differences in PEL between the first and the second lead arrangers within the same loan-year. 
We hope that this example facilitates a better reading of our empirical approach. 
 
Obs. Bank Year Loan PEL S 
1 1 1 1 0 5 
2 1 1 2 0 6 
3 1 2 3 0 4 
4 1 3 4 0 7 
5 1 4 5 0 5 




7 1 5 7 0 8 
8 1 5 8 0 9 
9 1 6 9 0 2 
10 1 6 10 0 5 
11 1 6 11 0 6 
12 1 6 12 0 7 
13 2 1 13 0 4 
14 2 1 14 0 7 
15 2 1 15 0 8 
16 2 1 16 0 9 
17 2 2 17 1 5 
18 2 2 18 1 6 
19 2 2 19 1 7 
20 2 2 20 1 8 
21 2 3 21 1 5 
22 2 3 22 1 4 
23 2 3 23 1 5 
24 3 1 24 0 6 
25 3 1 25 0 3 
26 3 1 26 0 8 
27 3 3 27 0 7 
28 3 3 28 0 6 
29 3 4 29 1 5 
30 3 4 30 1 9 
31 3 4 31 1 8 
32 3 5 32 1 7 
33 3 6 33 1 4 
34 4 1 1 0 5 
35 4 1 2 0 6 
36 4 2 3 0 4 
37 4 3 4 0 7 
38 4 4 5 0 5 
39 4 5 6 0 3 
40 4 5 7 0 8 
41 4 5 8 0 9 
42 4 6 9 0 2 
43 4 6 10 0 5 
44 4 6 11 0 6 
45 4 6 12 0 7 
46 5 1 13 0 4 
47 5 1 14 0 7 
48 5 1 15 0 8 
49 5 1 16 0 9 
50 5 2 17 0 5 
51 5 2 18 0 6 




53 5 2 20 1 8 
54 5 3 21 1 5 
55 5 3 22 1 4 
56 5 3 23 1 5 
57 6 1 24 0 6 
58 6 1 25 0 3 
59 6 1 26 0 8 
60 6 3 27 1 7 
61 6 3 28 1 6 
62 6 4 29 1 5 
63 6 4 30 1 9 
64 6 4 31 1 8 
65 6 5 32 1 7 





Appendix V. Results without Loan Controls 
In this Appendix, we report results from specifications without loan controls. In line with 
Angrist and Pischke (2008, pp. 47-51), this safeguards our analysis from a bad controls problem 
(some of the controls actually being outcome variables). In column I of the table below we 
report results from a specification using the fixed effects model (equivalent to specification I 
in Table IV). In column II we use the treatment effects model (equivalent to specification I in 
Table VIII). The results are very similar to their equivalents in the main text.   
 
Table A.III 
Models without Loan Controls 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead 
lenders. We estimate the regression: 𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 + 𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where 
b refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms and t for years. We estimate this 
regression on a loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. S 
represents the syndicate loan structure and is reported defined in the 
second line. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory and is 
defined as a dummy taking the value one for loans originated by a 
punished lead bank after the date t of the enforcement and zero for loans 
originated before the date of the enforcement action or for all loans 
originated by lead banks that were never punished during our sample 
period. All variables are defined in Table I. All regressions include fixed 
effects as shown in the lower part of the table and the standard errors are 
clustered by firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical 







Post enforcement loan 3.417*** 4.012***  
[3.516] [3.602] 
Observations 75,125 62,344 
Adjusted R-squared 0.854  
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes 
Firm*Year FE Yes No 
Bank*Year FE Yes No 




Appendix VI. Results from a Dynamic Treatment Model 
In this Appendix, we examine the dynamics enforcement actions, to see whether a sanction’s 
effect appears before the enactment. Our results below in Table A.IV provide evidence that 
there is no pre-trend in the syndicate structure. 
 
Table A.IV  
Dynamic treatment 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) 
only for lead lenders. We estimate the regression: 𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 +
𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where b refers to bank; l for 
loans, f for firms and t for years. We estimate this regression 
on a loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. S is 
defined as the lead lender shares (%) and represents the 
syndicate loan structure. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the 
main explanatory and is defined as a dummy taking the value 
one for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the 
date t of the enforcement and zero for loans originated before 
the date of the enforcement action or for all loans originated 
by lead banks that were never punished during our sample 
period. All variables are defined in Table I. All regressions 
include fixed effects as shown in the lower part of the table 
and the standard errors are clustered by firm and bank. The 
*, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, 
and 1% level, respectively.  
  I 
Dependent variable: Lead lender shares (%) 
Pre enforcement loan 0.065  
[0.598] 
Post enforcement loan 4.962***  
[2.876] 
Post enforcement loan (t+1) 3.450***  
[2.737] 
Maturity -5.384***  
[-18.936] 
Facility amount -6.972***  
[-14.778] 
Downgrading -2.463***  
[-4.830] 
Performance pricing -8.156***  
[-8.920] 
Collateral 2.502***  
[3.133] 
Lead-borrower relationship -5.155***  
[-14.246] 
Observations 95,981 
Adjusted R-squared 0.450 
Loan-purpose FE Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes 




Firm FE Yes 
Bank FE Yes 






Appendix VII. Results for Lending 
In this Appendix, we report results from specifications with the number of loans (columns I 
and II in the table below), the facility amount (columns III and IV), and the probability to work 
with new borrowers (column V and VI) as dependent variables. 
 
Table A.V 
Results for Lending 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead lenders. We estimate the regression: 𝑆 =
𝑎𝑓 + 𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where b refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms and t for years. We estimate this 
regression on a loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. S represents the syndicate loan structure and is 
reported defined in the second line. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory and is defined as a dummy 
taking the value one for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of the enforcement and zero for 
loans originated before the date of the enforcement action or for all loans originated by lead banks that were never 
punished during our sample period. All variables are defined in Table I. Specifications I, III, and Y are estimates 
with OLS on the fixed effects model and specifications II, IV, and VI with maximum likelihood on the treatment 
effects model (equivalent to specification I in Table VIII). All regressions include fixed effects as shown in the lower 
part of the table and the standard errors are clustered by firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.  
I II III IV V VI 












Post enforcement loan -0.107 -0.235 -0.017 -0.012 0.009 -0.015  
[-0.762] [-0.955] [-0.625] [-0.311] [0.107] [-0.322] 
Lon controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 75,125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.734  0.802  0.911  
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm*Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Bank*Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No 







Appendix VIII. Results from Bank Specialization 
In Table A.IV we dig deeper into the role of a bank’s sectoral exposure, as given by the loan 
amounts by industry (1-digit, 2-digit, 3-digit, and 4-digit SIC code). We follow Cai et al. (2018) 
and Gupta et al. (2017) to calculate banks’ sectoral exposure in each area of specialization as 
the share of lending of each bank to different sectors. Subsequently, for each lead arranger we 
compute the inverted and standardized Euclidean distance with the participant banks as 
follows: 














𝑏→𝑆 , for any bank b. 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡
𝑏→𝑠 is the amount (in millions USD) lent by bank b to sector s at time t and 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑡
𝑏→𝑆 
is the total amount (in millions USD) that bank b lent during the same year to the total number 
of sectors (S). Note that our analysis will assign a greater similarity measure to lead-participant 
banks that are “closer” to each other; hence, the use of inverse distances. Bank Similarity is a 
positive number, with zero corresponding to lack of similarity and larger values reflecting 
stronger similarity. 
The results are reported in Table A.IV. In columns I-IV we analyze one interaction term at a 
time between post enforcement loan and bank similarity based on the 1-digit, 2-digit, 3-digit, 
and 4-digit borrower SIC code, respectively. In all regressions, the coefficient of the interaction 
term is negative, indicating that higher similarity in the business model between the lead 







The Role of Sectoral Exposure in Mitigating Informational Asymmetry 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) only for lead lenders. We estimate the regression: 
𝑆 = 𝑎𝑓 + 𝑎1 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝑏,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐿𝑙,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓,𝑏,𝑙,𝑡 , where b refers to bank; l for loans, f for firms and t for years. We 
estimate this regression on a loan-level sample originated from 1997 to 2014. S represents the syndicate loan 
structure and is reported defined in the second line. PEL (post enforcement loan) is the main explanatory and 
is defined as a dummy taking the value one for loans originated by a punished lead bank after the date t of 
the enforcement and zero for loans originated before the date of the enforcement action or for all loans 
originated by lead banks that were never punished during our sample period. All variables are defined in 
Table I. All regressions include fixed effects as shown in the lower part of the table and the standard errors 
are clustered by firm and bank. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
  I II III IV 
  SIC1 SIC2 SIC3 SIC4 
Post enforcement loan 3.380** 4.412*** 3.519*** 2.178***  
[2.056] [3.388] [3.849] [3.302] 
Bank sectoral exposure -12.371*** -8.183* -1.234 1.512  
[-4.393] [-2.008] [-0.364] [0.614] 
Post enforcement loan * Bank sectoral exposure -1.154 -4.485* -2.094** -1.933*  
[-0.354] [1.777] [-2.177] [-1.855] 
Maturity -1.673*** -1.707*** -1.769*** -1.748***  
[-4.825] [-4.247] [-4.057] [-3.493] 
Facility amount -0.092 -0.093 -0.100 -0.106  
[-0.840] [-0.625] [-0.644] [-0.657] 
Downgrading -0.179 -0.214 -0.030 -0.134  
[-0.161] [-0.173] [-0.025] [-0.109] 
Performance pricing -5.033*** -5.236*** -5.384*** -5.366***  
[-9.127] [-9.512] [-9.352] [-9.031] 
Collateral -3.917*** -3.945*** -3.745*** -3.835***  
[-4.719] [-4.964] [-4.845] [-4.829] 
Lead-borrower relationship -5.177*** -4.916** -3.545** -3.393**  
[-3.958] [-2.432] [-2.521] [-2.406] 
Marginal effect of post enforcement loan 2.226 -0.073 1.427 0.242 
(P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 63,190 63,872 63,244 62,868 
Adjusted R-squared 0.882 0.882 0.881 0.881 
Loan-purpose FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan-type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank*Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Bank-Firm Bank-Firm Bank-Firm Bank-Firm 
 
 
